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Consent Decrees Without Consent:
The Rights of
Nonconsenting Third Parties
Douglas Laycockt
A consent decree is simply a settlement that includes an in-
junction. Both cash settlements and consent decrees transfer some-
thing of value from defendant to plaintiff. Settling by injunction
rather than cash does not change the essential nature of settle-
ment, but it does introduce new risks and problems.
One risk peculiar to consent decrees is that the transfer might
not be from defendant to plaintiff. Even in trilateral disputes, it is
almost impossible for a defendant to pay a cash settlement with
someone else's money.1 But defendants frequently enter into con-
sent decrees purporting to surrender someone else's rights. This
can happen whenever the dispute involves the rights of some third
party; I will refer to such disputes as trilateral. The triangle may
consist of minority employees, other employees, and a discriminat-
ing employer;2 current employees, retired employees, and a bank-
rupt employer;3 the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"),
public school officials, and extracurricular student prayer groups;4
or the United States, an oil company, and Indian owners of oil and
t A. Dalton Cross Professor at Law, The University of Texas at Austin. I am grateful to
the participants in the University of Chicago Legal Forum symposium on consent decrees,
and to Mark Gergen, Julius Getman, Robert Hamilton, Sanford Levinson, William Powers,
David Rabban, Cookie Stephan, Teresa Sullivan, Louise Weinberg, Jay Westbrook, and
Charles Alan Wright for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Fred Garrett, Russell Miller,
and Karra Porter provided research assistance.
I Compare note 10.
2 See generally Charles J. Cooper, The Collateral Attack Doctrine and the Rules of
Intervention: A Judicial Pincer Movement on Due Process, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 155 (re-
viewing cases in which employer and minority plaintiffs consent to quotas without participa-
tion of other affected applicants and employees); Comment, Collateral Attacks on Employ-
ment Discrimination Consent Decrees, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 147 (1986) (same). See also
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (employer, union, and white employee litigated
quota without participation of affected black employees); University of California Regents v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (medical school and white applicant litigated student admissions
quota without participation of affected black applicants).
' In re Century Brass Products, Inc., 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1986).
4 Harrisburg Ch. of Am. Civ. Lib. v. Scanlon, 500 Pa. 549, 458 A.2d 1352 (1983).
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gas interests.
This article explores a simple thesis: a decree in which A and
B agree to transfer the arguable rights of C is not a consent decree
unless C also consents. No court should approve such a decree un-
less C consents, or unless the plaintiff joins C as a defendant and
proves all the elements of a claim that a court can lawfully impose
on C all the burdens that C bears under the decree. A and B can
agree by contract to whatever they want, but the court should not
enter their agreement as a consent decree without the participation
of C. If a court does enter such a decree without the consent of C,
C should be wholly and genuinely unbound by the decree, able to
force de novo litigation of his rights by merely filing a complaint or
a motion to intervene.
This thesis follows from well-settled principles. The court's re-
medial power may be exercised only on the basis of a violation of
law,6 and neither violation nor remedy may be adjudicated without
notice and hearing for the parties to be bound.7 These rights may
be waived in a consent decree, but a consent decree may be en-
tered only with the consent of the parties.8 Whether entered by
litigation or consent, decrees do not bind those who were not par-
ties.9 With respect to C, a decree to which A and B consent is
neither a consent decree nor a litigated decree. It is simply beyond
the power of the court.10
5 Sanguine Ltd. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 798 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1986).
6 General Building Contractors Assn. v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982); Milliken v. Brad-
ley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-82 (1977); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1976); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974); Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
7 U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV (due process clauses); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). For analysis of similar problems in litigated cases, see Carl
Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C.L. Rev. 745
(1987).
8 United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 334 (1964).
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979); Sea-Land Services, Inc. v.
Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 593 (1974); Blonder-Tongue v. University Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
329 (1971); Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100, 108-12 (1969); Hansberry v. Lee, 311
U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940); Chase National Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934).
1o The nearest parallel in damage litigation is where a settling defendant seeks contri-
bution or indemnity from a non-settling defendant. In jurisdictions that allow such claims,
the settling defendant must of course prove that the non-settling defendant is actually liable
to plaintiff. "The ultimate problem with any other rule... is that potentially it would allow
B (the original defendants) to spend C's (the third-party defendant) money without the
final judgment of a court or C's agreement." Tankrederiet Gefion A/S v. Hyman-Michaels
Company, 406 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (6th Cir. 1969). "It would ... offend due process if an
indemnitee's unilateral acts could bind the indemnitor without notice and an opportunity to
be heard." GAB Business Services, Inc. v. Syndicate 627, 809 F.2d 755, 760 (11th Cir. 1987).
See also Swartz v. Sunderland, 403 Pa. 222, 169 A.2d 289 (1961); Consolidated Coach Corp.
v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16 (1932); Home Ins. Co. v. Advance Machine Co., 443 So.
NONCONSENTING THIRD PARTIES
This summary statement of the thesis does not attempt to
specify who counts as a C. It will be necessary to establish some
boundaries to the class of Cs who must be joined before the decree
is entered.1 But it is important to examine the core of the problem
before examining the cases at the boundary.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. Some Illustrative Cases
Sometimes it is obvious that A and B are bargaining over the
rights of C. An example is Harrisburg Chapter of the American
Civil Liberties Union v. Scanlon.12 The ACLU as plaintiff, and va-
rious school districts and education officials as defendants, agreed
that extracurricular student groups could not pray on high school
campuses. No extracurricular student prayer group was joined as a
party; certainly no such group consented to this decree.
The striking thing about this decree is that only the student
prayer groups were directly affected. The ACLU did not claim for
itself the right to do anything, receive anything, or refrain from
doing anything. Rather, it asserted a wholly external preference: 3
the ACLU preferred that the student prayer groups be excluded
from campus. The school officials were like the stakeholder in an
interpleader, caught between the primary antagonists and proba-
bly having no strong preference. But any preference the school offi-
cials did have was as external as the ACLU's. The attempt to liti-
gate this case without joining the student prayer group excluded
the party with the greatest stake.
2d 165 (Fla. App. 1983); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 886A comment (g) (1981); W.
Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton and David G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts 339-40 (5th ed. 1984). Some courts have applied a less demanding rule in
indemnity cases where the settling defendant invited the non-settling defendant to take
over defense of the case. See GAB, 809 F.2d at 760-61.
Once the non-settling defendant's liability is established, courts give some weight to the
amount of the settlement. But again the settlement is not dispositive. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 886A comment (d) (1981), and the other authorities cited in this note.
Partial deference to the amount of the settlement is less troublesome, because both defend-
ants have the same interest in minimizing plaintiff's damages. The settling defendant will
bear a proportionate share of the settlement even if he recovers contribution. He also risks
bearing the whole settlement cost himself, because his claim for contribution or indemnity
may fail.
" See text at notes 86-96.
12 500 Pa. 549, 458 A.2d 1352 (1983).
" The distinction between personal preferences and external preferences is developed
in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 234-38 (1977). See also John Stuart Mill, On
Liberty 141-42 (Penguin ed. 1982).
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The Commonwealth Court refused to approve the decree, be-
cause the student groups had not consented. The parties appealed.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed over the vigorous
dissent of two justices. The dissenters undertook to resolve the
claims of the extracurricular student prayer groups, concluding
that they had no right to meet on campus. This conclusion re-
quired the dissenters to resolve questions of law and fact that
would undoubtedly have been disputed if the student prayer
groups had been joined as defendants. The ACLU had a plausible
Establishment Clause claim to exclude them; the student prayer
groups had plausible claims under the Free Speech, Free Exercise,
and Equal Protection Clauses that they were entitled to use spare
classrooms on equal terms with other extracurricular groups.1
These competing claims have been the subject of substantial de-
bate.15 But the merits are irrelevant to the procedural point: the
court could not decide the rights of the student prayer groups
before it heard their case.
Wilder v. Bernstein, 6 discussed elsewhere in this volume,1
7
provides another example. The City of New York, and plaintiff
children represented by the ACLU, consented that Catholic and
Jewish social agencies would provide equal access to social ser-
vices-that they would not prefer Catholic or Jewish clients. The
lawyers tell us that both the City and the plaintiffs desired that
result;' 8 only the religious agencies were opposed. Despite the bit-
ter litigation over other issues, Wilder was a friendly suit with re-
spect to the equal access issue. Indeed, Richard Epstein plausibly
argues that by the time of settlement, it had become a friendly suit
on other issues as well. 19
The Wilder plaintiffs were pursuing personal benefits and not
merely external preferences. But just as in Harrisburg ACLU, the
" Today, the student prayer groups would also have a prima facie claim under the
Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (Supp. 1985).
"I The arguments for each side are fully debated in Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and
Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 1 (1986); Ruti G. Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal Access Policies and
Legislation Allowing Organized Student-Initiated Religious Activities in the Public High
Schools: A Proposal for a Unitary First Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 Hastings Const.
L.Q. 529 (1985).
11 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
' Burt Neuborne and Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., A Prelude to the Settlement of
Wilder, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 177.
" Id. at 206.
19 Richard A. Epstein, Wilder v. Bernstein: Squeeze Play by Consent Decree, 1987 U.
Chi. Legal F. 209, 224 (1987).
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focus of the litigation was on the behavior of the nonconsenting
third parties. The plaintiff class sought to change the regulatory
behavior of the City, but only as a means to change the primary
behavior of the agencies. That the regulatory mechanism was a
contract between the City and the agencies may change the law
applicable to the merits, but it does not shift the focus away from
the agencies. Because the point of the litigation was to regulate the
agencies, they should have been joined as defendants. Indeed, the
court noted that the agencies would be bound by the decree, be-
cause they were in privity with defendant and, alternatively, be-
cause they acted in concert with defendant.20
The agencies had claims and defenses arising from their con-
tracts with the City and from the Free Exercise Clause. Religious
agencies have a substantial claim to autonomy in their opera-
tions.21 That claim may be at its weakest in the context of a reli-
gious agency that is selling its services to the state; plaintiffs and
the City may argue that the agencies surrendered free exercise pro-
tection when they accepted state funds and undertook to perform
state functions. But that response raises serious issues under the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.22 Once again there is a
conflict between the values of the Establishment, Equal Protec-
tion, and Free Exercise Clauses. Perhaps the agencies would not
have prevailed on the merits, but there was no way to decide those
issues without letting the agencies litigate them.
The legitimacy of the Wilder decree thus depends entirely on
the adequacy of the hearing held in response to the religious agen-
cies' objections to the settlement. The decree is in no sense a con-
sent decree, and the consent of the City and the plaintiff adds
nothing to the legitimacy of the decree's impact on the agencies.
The hearing held on the agencies' objections was more elaborate
than most such hearings, but it also gave substantial weight to the
consent of the original parties. The court doubted whether plain-
2 Wilder, 645 F. Supp. at 1319.
21 See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Douglas Laycock,
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations
and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373 (1981).
22 See, for example, Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1980); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963); Speiser v. Ran-
dall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Peter Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights," 33 UCLA L. Rev.
977 (1986); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Con-
stitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439 (1968). An unconstitutional condition on the exercise
of religion is often described as a burden, or an indirect burden, on the exercise of religion.
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 107 S. Ct 1046, 1049 (1987); Thomas
v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716-18 (1981).
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tiffs were required to make any showing on the merits;23 it as-
sumed that they were required to show "a serious claim" or "a rea-
sonable basis for the compromise. "24 Inquiry under that standard
could not adjudicate the agencies' rights no matter how elaborate
the hearing. In any event, the opportunity to object to a done deal
will rarely equal the opportunity to litigate a case from the
beginning.
Affirmative action cases offer the most common contemporary
example of consent decrees that alter the rights of nonconsenting
third parties.2 5 The procedural issues are the same whether minor-
ity employees sue to impose a quota or other employees sue to pre-
vent a quota. Courts have been properly criticized for litigating re-
verse discrimination suits without the participation of the affected
minority groups,2" and one can easily imagine the reaction if an
employer and a union entered into a consent decree forbidding af-
firmative action.27 The civil rights bar would not think that minori-
ties were bound by such a decree. But most of the cases involve the
opposite situation, in which an employer and minority plaintiffs
agree to impose a quota.
The leading case in this area is Local Number 93 v. City of
Cleveland."5 Plaintiff was an organization of black and Hispanic
firefighters, the Vanguards. The Vanguards sued the City, alleging
that its examination and other promotion practices discriminated
against minority firefighters. The City and the Vanguards
promptly began negotiating with a view to settling the case by im-
posing a racial quota on promotions. They apparently planned not
to involve the firefighter's union in the negotiations, but the dis-
trict judge insisted that they do so. When the resulting trilateral
negotiations failed to reach agreement, the City and the Vanguards
submitted a bilateral decree providing for quotas. The trial court
entered the decree, and that decision was affirmed by the court of
appeals2" and then by the Supreme Court.30
23 Wilder, 645 F. Supp. at 1321.
24 Id. at 1322.
2 The cases are collected in Comment, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 147 (cited in note 2).
26 Emma Coleman Jones, Litigation Without Representation: The Need for Interven-
tion to Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 31 (1979).
27 Compare Note, Participation and Department of Justice School Desegregation Con-
sent Decrees, 95 Yale L.J. 1811 (1986) (criticizing school desegregation decrees entered on
consent of school board and Department of Justice without participation of black school
children or their representatives).
28 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
29 Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1985).
30 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
[1987:
NONCONSENTING THIRD PARTIES
The only source of judicial authority to enter this decree was
the consent of two of the three parties. The case had not been
tried, discrimination had not been proven, and the court had made
no findings. The Supreme Court held that none of that mattered,
because the decree was based on consent. The union argued that
the quota remedy exceeded what the court could have ordered
even if discrimination had been proven. The Supreme Court found
it unnecessary to resolve that issue, because the decree was based
on consent." The union also argued that the decree violated a stat-
utory restriction on remedies,32 but the Court held that the restric-
tion did not apply to consent decrees.3 In short, the consent of the
City and the Vanguards made it unnecessary to decide any of the
union's arguments on the merits.
Then the Court turned to the critical issue: How does it an-
swer the union's claims of substantive right that someone else con-
sented? The Court's answer was based on two seemingly indisputa-
ble principles. First, "it has never been supposed that one
party . . . could preclude other parties from settling their own
disputes and thereby withdrawing from litigation." '34 Second, the
settling parties "may not dispose of the claims of a third party,"35
so the union would not be bound by anything in the settlement.
The problem is not with these principles, but with their appli-
cation to such an inextricably trilateral dispute. The point of the
litigation was to allocate a limited pool of jobs between two groups
of employees. The City may have had other interests in the case,
but with respect to the quota it was little more than a stakeholder.
As in Harrisburg ACLU and Wilder, the nonconsenting third
party had a far more direct stake than the consenting defendant.
The union also had plausible claims that the quota went be-
yond the limits imposed on such quotas in the litigated cases. Any
applicant or employee rejected because of a quota has a prima fa-
cie claim under Title VIIL 6 There is a judicial exception for quotas
designed to remedy past discrimination, but employers are not free
to impose any kind of quota that benefits minorities. There are
emerging rules and limits: the discrimination must be egregious 3i
"Id. at 3077-79.
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
106 S. Ct. at 3073-77.
Id. at 3079.
35 Id.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273,
278-85 (1976).
' See United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1065-67 (1987) (plurality opinion);
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and if a court orders the quota or if a public employer adopts it,
the discrimination must be attributable to the employer."8 The
quota must be tailored to the violation;39 the interests of other em-
ployees must not be unduly trammeled; 0 the quota must be flexi-
ble and temporary;41 and the beneficiaries must be qualified.42 The
most recent cases are fully consistent with these limits. 43 These
limits protect the interests of other affected workers, and these
workers plainly have standing to litigate whether these limits have
been exceeded. The court cannot resolve that issue until these
workers have been heard.
B. The Central Conundrum
In each of these cases, a defendant (B) is caught between con-
flicting claims of plaintiffs (A) and one or more third parties (C).
In each case there is a serious dispute between A and C: can the
student groups pray in classrooms; can religious social agencies
with government contracts prefer their coreligionists; how will the
limited number of officer positions be allocated? In each case the
Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C., 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3036, 3050-51, 3053 (1986)
(plurality opinion); id. at 3054-55 (Powell, J., concurring). In Title VII cases, there must be
a "manifest" or "conspicuous imbalance" in a "traditionally segregated occupation." John-
son v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1451-52 (1987); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
11 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1847-49 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Paradise, 107 S. Ct at 1065; Local 28, 106 S. Ct at 3036, 3050, 3053; id. at 3054-55 (Powell,
J., concurring). This requirement does not apply to private employers governed only by
Title VII and not by the Equal Protection Clause. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1449-53; Steel-
workers, 443 U.S. at 198.
11 See Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1071-72; Local 28, 106 S. Ct. at 3050, 3053; id. at 3055-56
(Powell, J., concurring); Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846-52; id. at 1853, 1857 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
40 See Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1455-56; Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1067, 1073; Local 28, 106
S. Ct. at 3052, 3053; id. at 3055-56 (Powell, J., concurring); Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1850-52;
id. at 1853-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1857-58 (White, J., concurring); Steelwork-
ers, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
11 See Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1456; Paradise, 107 S. Ct. at 1067, 1070-71; Local 28, 106
S. Ct. at 3051-52; id. at 3055-56 (Powell, J., concurring); Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
4" See Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1454-55; Paradise, 107 S. Ct at 1073; Local 28, 106 S. Ct.
at 3035. "Qualified" apparently means qualified in the sense of meeting some absolute re-
quirement, and not in the sense of being the best person available for the job.
"' Paradise affirmed an order imposing a promotion quota on the Alabama Department
of Public Safety. When the quota was ordered, twelve years after the initial liability deter-
mination, the Department had only four black corporals and no blacks with any higher
rank. 107 S. Ct. at 1062-63. In Johnson, the beneficiary of affirmative action was promoted
into a job category with 238 men and no women. 107 S. Ct. at 1454. The male plaintiff's
claim to be more qualified was based on an insignificant difference (75 versus 73) on a
scored interview. Id. at 1448.
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consent decree purports to resolve the dispute in a way that rejects
some or all of the claims of C.
In each case, either the decree limits the rights of C or it does
not. If the decree does not limit the rights of C, it contributes little
to resolution of the dispute. Litigation can continue as though the
decree had never been entered. If the decree does limit the rights
of C, the court has acted without authority. The court cannot de-
prive C of his claimed rights on the basis of consent, because C has
not consented. 4 It cannot deprive C of his claimed rights on the
basis of adjudication, because it has not adjudicated anything, and
because it cannot adjudicate C's substantive rights without giving
C full procedural rights.45
The Supreme Court in Local Number 93 did not come to grips
with this conundrum. It said that the decree did not attempt to
dispose of the union's rights.4 But the rest of the opinion plainly
took the view that the consent decree accomplished something im-
portant. Settlement is an important policy of Title VII, the Court
said, and it would not interpret the statute in a way that made
settlement "more difficult. '4 7
Perhaps the Court thought the consent decree would simplify
the litigation by neutralizing the City. In other words, the decree
bound the City to implement quotas if possible, and perhaps it
took away the City's right to oppose quotas in any subsequent liti-
gation between the Vanguards and the union. Under this interpre-
tation, the Vanguards would have gained the right to deal with
only one opponent instead of two. That is worth something, but if
the union is well-represented and if all issues remain open to liti-
gation, it is not worth much.
The Court might also have thought the consent decree had
value as a temporary solution: the quotas could operate until and
unless the union or an affected firefighter raised the issue. But the
Court seemed to have more in mind. In listing the advantages of
consent decrees over ordinary contracts, it said that settlements in
public law cases were "designed to be carried out over a period of
years." '48
" This statement is tautologically true. For a case applying the stated rule to a named
party, see United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 334 (1964).
"I Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
46 106 S. Ct. at 3080.
47 Id. at 3077 n.13.
48 Id.
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The Court cannot have it both ways. The decree must either
bind the union and settle the dispute over promotion quotas, fail
to bind the union and settle nothing, or partly settle the dispute by
severely hampering but not absolutely precluding any further at-
tempt to assert the union's claims. Apart from quite marginal and
temporary benefits, any good the decree might do is directly de-
pendent on its power to bind the union. The Court cannot say that
the decree is effective but that the union is not bound.
The Court may well have thought that the union would be
hampered, even barred, but not bound by res judicata. After saying
that the union was not bound, the Court said it might be too late
for the union to raise its claims.49 A bar based on timeliness could
bind the union as effectively as res judicata. Such a result has con-
siderable support in the lower court cases.50 If this is what the
Court has in mind, it is disingenuous to say the union is not
bound. 1
The holding in Local Number 93 repeats an earlier error that
required amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 24 required a would-be intervenor to show that he "is or may
be bound by a judgment in the action," and that he is not ade-
quately represented by an existing party.52 The Supreme Court
held in effect that this standard could never be met, because if the
would-be intervenor were inadequately represented, he would not
be bound. 3 The Court explicitly refused to consider practical ob-
stacles arising from the decree. The result was an amendment to
Rules 19 and 24, requiring joinder or permitting intervention "if as
a practical matter" the litigation would impair the interest of a
nonparty. 54 It is equally important to examine the practical conse-
quences to C of a consent decree between A and B.
4 Id. at 3080.
5o See text at notes 155-67.
5' The holding in Local Number 93 may have been colored by the union's litigation
strategy. The union intervened as a defendant, and then "despite the efforts of the District
Judge to persuade it to do so, the Union failed to raise any substantive claims." 106 S. Ct. at
3080. Perhaps the union was guilty of some genuine procedural default, but it is impossible
to tell from the reported opinions. Perhaps the union asserted only substantive defenses,
and not "claims." But this would be wholly appropriate; the union was seeking only to pre-
vent a decree from being entered over its objection. In any event, the Court's primary hold-
ing-that C cannot prevent a consent decree between A and B-did not depend on its ob-
servation about the union's failure to raise substantive claims.
52 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 24(a)(2) (1961), quoted in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. U.S., 366
U.S. 683, 685 n.2 (1961).
" Sam Fox, 366 U.S. at 691-92.
" Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 24(a) and Notes of Advisory Committee to 1966 Amendment.
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Some courts have refused to approve bilateral consent decrees
in trilateral disputes. 5 5 But Local Number 93 commits the Su-
preme Court to approving such decrees, and many other courts
have done so, especially in affirmative action cases.5 6 Some of these
courts have gone further, and insulated such decrees from subse-
quent attack by C.57 Local Number 93 says that C is not bound,
but it is unclear whether the Court is serious about that promise.
C. The Nature of Bilateral Negotiation in Trilateral Disputes
1. If C Will Be Bound by the Negotiation. The legitimacy of
consent decrees depends on the legitimacy of the negotiating pro-
cess that produces them. Bilateral negotiation in trilateral disputes
is wholly unlike ordinary settlement negotiations, and there is no
reason to believe that the resulting decrees are either just or effi-
cient.5 8 If A and B settle a case by transferring money or some
other thing of value from B to A, we can assume that both sides
found the settlement more attractive than the risks of litigation.59
If the value transferred is substantial, it follows that the risk of
liability was substantial. But if part of the cost can be shifted to C,
the settlement becomes a bargain. If enough of the cost can be
shifted to C, the bargain may be irresistible. A settlement in these
circumstances shows only that the residual settlement costs borne
by B are less than the risks B faces in litigation. A rational B might
generously settle even a frivolous claim if C will bear the cost.
In Harrisburg ACLU, the entire cost of the settlement with
respect to student prayer groups fell on the unrepresented stu-
05 United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 664 F.2d 435, 436, 447-48 (1981); Harrisburg Ch.
of Am. Civ. Lib. v. Scanlon, 500 Pa. 549, 458 A.2d 1352 (1983). See also Sanguine, Ltd. v.
U.S. Dept. of Interior, 798 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1986) (vacating bilateral consent decree on
motion of third-party intervenor); In re Century Brass Products, Inc., 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.
1986) (holding that bankrupt employer had not sufficiently bargained with affected employ-
ees to satisfy procedural prerequisites to rejection of collective bargaining agreement, be-
cause union could not represent both incumbent and retired employees of bankrupt
employer).
56 See generally Cooper, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 155, 156 n.4 (cited in note 2).
17 Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 2177, order
granting cert. amended, 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987); Samayoa by Samayoa v. Chicago Bd. of
Educ., 798 F.2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1986); Deveraux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985); Thag-
gard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982); Dennison v. City of Los Angeles, etc.,
658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally Cooper, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 155 (cited in note
2).
.. For opposing views of the justice and efficiency of consent decrees in bilateral dis-
putes, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Chi.
Legal F. 19 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 1 (1987).
" See Easterbrook, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 19-20 n.1 and sources cited therein.
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dents. The settling school districts gave up nothing on that issue.60
In Wilder, substantially all the cost of the equal access settlement
appears to have fallen on the religious agencies.61 Undoubtedly the
City bore some cost; its dealings with the agencies became more
difficult. But it was the agencies, not the City, that had to change
their behavior and compromise their principles.
Quota settlements in discrimination cases transfer much of the
cost to third parties. An employer who litigates to judgment in a
Title VII class action may be held liable for substantial amounts of
back pay. But if the employer promises a racial preference in fu-
ture employment decisions, it may settle the case with no back pay
or with considerably less than the amount for which it might have
been liable. The Supreme Court has mistakenly seen this as a
virtue. 2
The cost of the racial preference is largely borne by other em-
ployees and future applicants, mostly white but also minorities not
included in the quota. Employment opportunities for these groups
will be reduced. The employer may bear some cost in lowered mo-
rale and racial tension,63 and if the employer must hire less quali-
fied applicants, productivity will suffer. But compared to the alter-
native of actually paying the victims of discrimination, a quota
remedy is an enormous bargain for the employer. Some courts have
held that the employer adequately represents the other employ-
ees, 64 but those holdings wholly ignore the employer's incentives.
Judge Easterbrook considers those incentives but still finds
the employer an adequate representative. He suggests that the
other employees will somehow put the cost back on the employer
"0 The decree also settled other claims on which the schools districts did bear some of
the cost of settlement.
See Epstein, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 220-22 (cited in note 19).
62 See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1451 n.8 (1987); Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 211 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1855-56 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" The point is noted in Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 555 n.12 (6th Cir.
1982).
64 Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579, 583 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982). The same view is
implicit in Corley v. Jackson Police Dept., 755 F.2d 1207, 1210 (5th Cir. 1985). But see
United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1983). In Jefferson
County, the union argued that it moved to intervene as soon as it learned the employer
would not adequately protect its interests. The court held the motion untimely, noting that
the employer and the union had quite different incentives from the beginning; it called the
union's decision to rely on the employer "ill-advised." So white employees are excluded be-
cause their employer either does or does not adequately represent them. The explanation
varies, but not the result.
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through higher pay or better conditions.6 5 The Supreme Court re-
lied on similar but more restrained reasoning when it held that
employers have standing to litigate the imposition of a layoff
quota. 6 I have no doubt that the employer is sufficiently affected
to have standing, but the notion that the employees can shift all or
most of the cost back to the employer is reflexive economic deter-
minism with little basis in experience.
The employer can hide behind the decree, pretending that the
law and the court forced him to adopt the quota; the quota is not
one of his demands to be put on the bargaining table. 7 Moreover,
any form of compensation to the disappointed whites would also
have to go to the benefited minorities. A better deal for the whites
would violate Title VII;68 and in the collective bargaining context,
it would violate the duty of fair representation 9 and ignore the
reality of across-the-board benefits. I would be very surprised if
empirical research showed that imposition of a quota in the work-
place leads to a more generous total compensation package. The
only way to shift the cost back to the employer is through a judg-
ment, award, or settlement that compensates losses caused by the
quota. Such a result is possible only if the whites are not fully
bound by the consent decree.
A consent decree in which much of the cost is borne by non-
consenting third parties is likely to be a settlement that pays more
than the case is worth. It is not just that B has little reason to
resist on behalf of C. That is important, but the negotiating pos-
ture may have changed more fundamentally. In the typical settle-
ment negotiation, some irretrievable loss has occurred, and A and
B negotiate over which of them should bear the cost. But in bilat-
eral negotiations over trilateral disputes, the negotiating dynamic
may permit A and B to divide a windfall appropriated from C. It is
generally easier to divide gains than to divide losses.7 ° If sacrificing
the job opportunities of white employees can expand job opportu-
nities for minorities and eliminate back pay liability for the em-
ployer, the incentives to agree are enormous. That source of incen-
066 Frank H. Easterbrook, comments made at the University of Chicago Legal Forum
symposium, November 15, 1986.
6 Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 570 n.4 (1984).
6 See Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 43, 70.
68 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(a) (1982).
69 See, for example, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steele v. L. & N. R. Co., 323
U.S. 192 (1944).
70 See Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 Va. L. Rev.
947, 959-60 (1982).
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tive to agree disappears if the whites must agree to bear the cost of
the settlement.
This settlement dynamic means that the fact of settlement
proves nothing about the rights of A, B, or C. A decree to which C
did not consent is no evidence that C's rights may be overridden.
But equally important, a decree in which B consents that C pay is
no evidence that B has done anything wrong, or that A is entitled
to relief. It is essential to keep this point in mind. Courts tend to
assume that B is guilty and C is obstructionist. Sometimes that is
true, but B's consent that C should lose does not prove the point.
In affirmative action cases, there is a tendency to assume that
whites are fighting to preserve their unfair share of the jobs. Some-
times they are, but the employer's consent to a quota does not
prove that. Sometimes the whites are fighting racial discrimination
in the form of a quota that goes far beyond what is necessary to
remedy their employer's past offenses. The only way to tell the dif-
ference is to try the case or negotiate a settlement with the real
parties in interest.
This analysis of B's incentives is fully consistent with more
general work on trilateral relationships by sociologists, game theo-
rists, and others.7 1 All trilateral relationships tend to produce co-
alitions of two against the third, and these coalitions are often un-
stable. With some distributions of relative power, each member of
the triad can exercise disporportionate power if he is willing to
switch his support between the other two, and he can maximize his
power if he observes no principle but self-interest.7 '2 Thus, it is not
necessary to assume that the Pennsylvania school officials in Har-
risburg ACLU were hostile to student prayer groups, or that em-
ployers are genuinely committed to affirmative action. They can
ally themselves with plaintiffs out of sheer self-interest.
In a discrete episode, such as a lawsuit, the parties can ally
themselves -for that episode only.73 Thus, it is no surprise that a
plaintiff and a defendant may unite against a codefendant or third
party; the law is full of examples. Criminal defendants turn state's
evidence;74 plaintiffs take assignments of defendants' claims
7' This paragraph is based on two classic works. Theodore Caplow, Further Develop-
ment of a Theory of Coalitions in the Triad, 64 Am. J. Soc. 488 (1959); Kurt H. Wolff, ed.,
The Sociology of Georg Simmel 154-69 (1950).
72 Wolff at 157-58.
73 A lawsuit may be either an episodic or terminal situation in Caplow's terms. See
Caplow, 64 Am. J. Soc. at 489 (cited in note 71). Either situation produces opportunities for
shifting coalitions. Id. at 490, Table I.
7' Consider, for example, the alliance between Ivan Boesky and the Securities and Ex-
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against their liability insurers; 5 and defendants settle in exchange
for a share in plaintiffs' claims against codefendants.7 6 Except for
the peculiar cases discussed in this article, the law does not assume
that either party in such negotiations adequately represents the in-
terests of the third party in the triad.
2. If C Will Not Be Bound by the Negotiation. If A and B
knew that the consent decree could not bind C, their negotiations
would be very different. If the consent decree would really have no
effect on C, A would surrender rights against B and get little in
return. In Harrisburg ACLU, the student prayer groups could gain
the use of classrooms by making the same showing that would have
been required if the consent decree had never been entered. In
Wilder, the religious agencies could continue to prefer their coreli-
gionists with the same showing that would have been required if
the decree had never been entered. In the affirmative action cases,
other employees could prevent or undo quotas with the same show-
ing that would have been required if no consent decree had ever
been entered. If a class of minority employees surrendered its back
pay claim in exchange for a quota, and then lost the quota because
other employees were not bound, it would have surrendered its
claim and gained nothing. At most, the consent decree would affect
B's behavior until the matter was resolved in actual litigation.
If C successfully insisted that B disregard the consent decree,
A might recover compensation from B. 7 But the availability of
damages would be uncertain, the damage remedy would be inade-
quate,7 '8 and compensation would rarely be what A really wants.
Most plaintiffs would rather avoid harm than suffer harm and re-
ceive compensation. Certainly the ACLU would prefer to keep the
student prayer groups out of the schools. Nominal damages would
change Commission. See Big Trader to Pay U.S. $100 Million for Insider Abuses, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 15, 1986, p.1, col.1; Boesky Said to Aid Inquiry by Taping of Wall St. Talks,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1986, p.1, col.6; S.E.C. is Under Fire in Letting Boesky Sell Off Hold-
ings; He Avoided Heavy Losses, N.Y.Times, Nov. 21, 1986, p.1, col.1.
75 See, for example, Allen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1981).
76 See, for example, Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1986). Such
agreements are called "Mary Carter agreements;" the name is derived from Booth v. Mary
Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. App. 1967).
77 See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983), described in text at
notes 103-111.
78 1 use "inadequate" in the technical sense, meaning that the injunction would be a
better remedy because money could not be used to replace the rights that were lost. See
Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies 339-41, 367-72 (1985). Compensatory con-
tempt would be inadequate in the same way. Id. at 637-38; Doug Rendleman, Compensatory
Contempt: Plaintiff's Remedy When a Defendant Violates an Injunction, 1980 U. Ill. L.F.
971, 985-86.
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be useless, and it would be hard-pressed to prove actual damages.79
There is a better prospect of collecting substantial sums in the af-
firmative action cases. Even so, most minority plaintiffs would
rather have permanent jobs than a lawsuit for lost pay. The law-
suit is risky, even though it will be easier to prove violation of the
consent decree than to prove past discrimination. And even if
plaintiffs win the lawsuit, back pay will not accrue forever.80 A
would rarely view compensation as an adequate substitute for the
consent decree.
C would predictably view the risk of inconsistent obligations
quite differently. Settling defendants want to know that the case is
really over; knowing that C could reopen the case at any time
would make settlement much less attractive. To be subject to in-
consistent injunctions and contempt proceedings would be a
nightmare. An unliquidated liability to A for obeying a decree in
favor of C would be only a small improvement. Any steps to make
the prospect of such compensation more certain and valuable to A
would increase the risks to B. Most people are risk averse; B will
predictably fear the risk of liability more than A will value the
chance of compensation.
To put the point in economic terms, performance of the con-
sent decree may improve the net welfare of A and B; compensation
for breach of the consent decree is unlikely to do so. One reason is
that breach and compensation deprives A and B of the subsidy
that the consent decree would extract from C. The other reason
follows from the assumption that A prefers the consent decree to
compensation. Where A values injunctive relief more than dam-
ages, the consent decree may benefit A more than it costs B. But
compensation for violating the decree costs B real money without
giving A what it wanted from the litigation. With such a lopsided
balance of costs and benefits, few litigants would agree to be bound
to each other by a decree that did not bind C.
A and B may attempt to get some of the advantages with
fewer risks by agreeing that if C successfully challenges the agree-
ment, A and B are released from any obligation to each other.
Judge Easterbrook describes this as a temporary cessation of hos-
1 Damages are not awarded for the value of the constitutional right. Memphis Commu-
nity School Dist. v. Stachura, 106 S. Ct. 2537, 2543-45 (1986); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247
(1978). Plaintiffs in school prayer cases rarely seek damages for emotional distress, and the
potential awards are small. See Abramson v. Anderson, 50 U.S.L.W. 2462 (S.D. Iowa 1982)
($300.00 award).
80 See, for example, Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982); United States v.
School Bd. of City of Suffolk, 418 F. Supp. 639, 651 (E.D. Va. 1976).
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tilities.5 Such a cease-fire is best embodied in a simple contract, or
even an unenforceable political understanding.
When the court enters the cease-fire, it is more like a continu-
ance than a consent decree. Courts purport to be granting more
than a continuance when they approve consent decrees. The pre-
mise of Local Number 93 is that A and B are bound but C is not.
But one court of appeals recently held that A and B should be
released from their obligations to each other if a court finds that
the decree cannot operate against C." 2 If that becomes the settled
rule, A and B will face little risk in a failed attempt to bind C with
a bilateral consent decree. A and B may be able to include a clause
providing for such an automatic release, but there is at least room
to doubt whether they can so control the court's discretion. In any
event, my impression is that recent consent decrees have not in-
cluded such clauses. To do so would seem to invite collateral at-
tack by C, a prospect that A and B have no desire to encourage.
3. Overview: Why A and B Do What They Do. To summarize,
a consent decree in which A and B impose the cost of settlement
on C is irresistably attractive if A and B believe that C will be
bound, seriously unattractive if they believe that they will be
bound and C will not, and akin to a continuance if they believe
that they will not be bound unless C is also bound. In most cases it
is plain that A and B are attempting to bind C and believe they
have a reasonable chance of doing so. If necessary for court ap-
proval of the decree, A and B may argue that C will not be
bound. But after the decree is entered, A and B regularly argue
that C is bound. Often that argument is accepted.
8 4
A and B sometimes have legitimate reasons for expecting that
C cannot undo the decree. They might be confident that C is too
uninterested to raise his potential objections or that his objections
will be rejected on the merits. But they need not put these expec-
tations to the test if their bilateral consent is enough to bind C.
A and B may also reasonably expect that the mere existence of
the consent decree will prevent or hinder any subsequent assertion
of rights by C. The consent decree hinders C because it makes the
court a party to the private agreement, makes the agreement en-
Easterbrook, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 40 (cited in note 58).
82 Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 961 (11th Cir. 1986).
83 A and B took that position in Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063,
3079-80 (1986).
" See cases cited in notes 155-57. For further discussion of the collateral attack doc-
trine, see generally Cooper, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 155 (cited in note 2).
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forceable by contempt, and creates an appearance of judicial reso-
lution of a difficult issue. Consider Harrisburg ACLU as an
illustration:
1) The ACLU and the school district could point to
a judicial decree and claim that the issue was settled.
The school district could deny political responsibility for
the decree and blame the court.8 5 Perhaps the student
prayer groups would accept the court order's authority.
They would be less likely to accept the authority of a pri-
vate agreement between the school district and the
ACLU.
2) The ACLU could threaten the school district with
contempt sanctions if it contemplated any settlement or
other accommodation with the student prayer groups.
The school district would predictably resist the less im-
mediately threatening claims of the student prayer
groups rather than resist the ACLU's contempt citation,
just as it had disregarded the possible future claims of
the student prayer groups rather than resist the ACLU's
existing lawsuit.
3) The judge would initially view the consent decree
as permanently removing one controversy from his busy
docket. He would not be favorably disposed to plaintiffs
who subsequently reopened the matter and sought to liti-
gate it.
4) If the student prayer groups were persistent
enough to sue, the ACLU and the school district could
argue that their consent decree was binding, or at least
entitled to weight. Even if these arguments were rejected,
overcoming them would considerably increase the ex-
pense and complexity of the litigation, thus reducing the
likelihood that the student prayer groups would file suit
or persist to judgment on the merits. -
5) If the student groups overcame all these obstacles
and won their case on the merits, the consent decree
would complicate the remedy. A defendant can pay dam-
ages for violating inconsistent obligations, but it cannot
comply with inconsistent injunctions. Either the consent
decree would have to be modified, or the students' rem-
edy would be limited to damages, or further litigation
Epstein, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 227 (cited in note 19).
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would determine which injunction was entitled to
obedience.
This array of practical obstacles makes sense of what would
otherwise be incomprehensible. A and B hope to gain a great deal
by making an unauthorized agreement about the rights of C. They
ask the court to enter the decree on the theory that it settles only
the dispute between A and B, but as soon as the decree is entered,
they act as though C is bound as well.
D. Who Counts as a C?
1. Before the Consent Decree Is Entered. The effects of a
consent decree may ripple outward, with smaller and smaller ef-
fects on more and more people, many of whom cannot feasibly be
joined. Injunctive litigation could rarely proceed if it were neces-
sary to join every third party who might be affected. My thesis
requires criteria for identifying those third parties whose stake in
the litigation is so great that no consent decree should be entered
without their consent.
C should be joined if A or B or the court know or should
know-in other words, if it is foreseeable-that C will be signifi-
cantly affected by the proposed decree and that he has an arguable
legal claim that he cannot be so affected.86 This formulation con-
tains several weasel words: "should know," "significantly," and
"arguable." Such terms are unavoidable; the question is inherently
one of degree. But some cases are clear, and the degree of uncer-
tainty is well within tolerable limits.
The duty to join C necessarily depends on what A or B or the
court should know. If C's claim is not foreseeable to either A or B
or the court, C cannot be joined. It would be illusory to impose a
duty that ignores that reality. If C's claim or defense is unforesee-
able to A or B or the court, C must bring it to their attention.
A or B or the court must foresee two things in order to foresee
C's claim. The first is factual: they must foresee that C will be sig-
nificantly affected by the decree. A and B need not search out all
the potential Cs who might be affected by some remote or inciden-
tal consequence of the consent decree. If millions of people are
marginally affected, as in some environmental litigation, the court
may reasonably conclude that none are affected so significantly
" Compare Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 19(a) (parties should join all who claim an "interest"
that may be impaired by the litigation); Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 24(a) (1982) (intcrvenor must
claim an "interest" that may be impaired by the litigation).
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that they must be joined. That judgment can be informed by the
impracticality of either joining millions of Cs or designating invol-
untary class representatives for them. 7 But where an identifiable
group of Cs has a direct and substantial stake in the litigation,
these Cs should be joined even if the group is large. Where one or a
few Cs will be affected in a way unique to them, the presumption
should be that the effect is significant enough to require that they
be joined. If C thinks the proposed decree will not significantly af-
fect him, he can consent to it, or even default. It is better to err on
the side of giving him notice.
The second thing that must be foreseeable is legal: that there
is available to C an arguable legal theory that C cannot be affected
in the way the proposed decree will affect him. Many third parties
are affected by the economic consequences of consent decrees in
ways that the law simply does not address. To take an obvious ex-
ample, consumers cannot attack a consent decree on the ground
that the expense of compliance will force defendant to raise prices.
Consumers may be interested in defendant's prices, but they rarely
have a legally protected interest. Such an unprotected interest
does not give consumers standing to object to consent decrees. An
example from a recent case is a neighborhood association objecting
to a decree desegregating public housing on the ground that new
public housing would reduce property values.8 8 Perhaps I am over-
looking something, but I cannot think of a legal theory that would
protect against that harm. If no legal theory for C is apparent, A
and B need not expend great efforts trying to develop one for him.
But if A or B or the court can identify a legal theory that C
might reasonably advance, they should not refuse to join him on
the ground that his legal theory will not prevail. It is enough that
C's legal theory is arguable. If C's interest might be legally pro-
tected, the court must hear from C before deciding whether the
interest actually is or is not legally protected. When the court
omits C from the litigation on the ground that C's arguments can-
not ultimately prevail,89 it is deciding C's case without notice or
87 See text at notes 184-208. Compare the decision whether to proceed in the absence of
a party who cannot be joined. Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 19(b).
88 Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 635 (7th Cir. 1982).
89 See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 558-59 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd as
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (absent collusion, consent
decree providing for quotas "does not adversely affect any legally protected interest of a
non-minority") (emphasis in original); Equal Employment, Etc. v. McCall Printing Corp.,
633 F.2d 1232, 1238 (6th Cir. 1980); Harrisburg Ch. of Am. Civ. Lib. v. Scanlon, 500 Pa. 549,
458 A.2d 1352, 1353-54 (1983) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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hearing.90
No bright line separates Cs who must be joined from those
who are too trivially affected or whose claim to legal protection is
too tenuous. But these undeniable difficulties at the margins do
not affect clear cases like the illustrations in this article. In these
illustrations, A and B knew perfectly well that C would be directly
and significantly affected. These decrees did not affect C in some
incidental way; their very purpose was to regulate C (in Harrisburg
ACLU and Wilder), or to split a limited fund with C (in the affirm-
ative action cases). When the effect on C is this direct, significant,
and purposive, C should be joined if there is any possibility
whatever that C has a viable legal theory.
C has an arguable legal right in each of these illustrations.9 '
The student prayer groups' claim to equal access is a straightfor-
ward application of the Supreme Court's cases on public fora and
content neutrality.9 2 Whether that claim is or should be overridden
by Establishment Clause concerns requires full litigation. When
Harrisburg ACLU was decided, the precedents in other jurisdic-
tions were conflicting.9 3 But even if all cases directly on point in
other jurisdictions were consistent and adverse to the student
prayer groups, an issue so controversial would remain arguable un-
til unambiguously resolved in a court whose precedents were bind-
ing on the court asked to approve the decree.
In Wilder, the religious agencies had some claims based on
contract. But these were short-term contracts.94 I would not con-
tend that plaintiffs or the City must anticipate a claim that the
course of dealing gave rise to an implied long-term contract, unless
they had actual notice that the agencies asserted such a claim. But
plaintiffs and the City must surely anticipate a free exercise
claim.9" The City and the ACLU undoubtedly believe the free ex-
90 Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1985), aff'd
as Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
"' See text at notes 14-15, 21-22, 36-43.
92 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980);
Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Southeastern Pro-
motions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
93 Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (student prayer group has free
speech right to meet on college campus), with Lubbock Civ. Lib. Union v. Lubbock Ind. Sch.
Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982) (student prayer group meeting on high school campus
violates establishment clause). See generally Laycock, 81 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 (cited in note 15);
Teitel, 12 Hastings Const. L.Q. 529 (cited in note 15).
94 See Epstein, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 211, 222 (cited in note 19).
95 See text at notes 21-22.
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ercise claim should be rejected, but anyone litigating the case
should have foreseen the claim. It takes no great imagination to
foresee a claim that religious charities have a right to care for their
coreligionists first, even if they also agree to help the state care for
others.
In the affirmative action cases, the argument over quotas has
plagued Title VII from the day it was enacted. The Supreme Court
has now rejected the view that all quotas are permitted if they
benefit minorities and also the view that all quotas are forbidden. 6
The rules that govern the legality of quotas are unclear and fact-
intensive. It is impossible to imagine an affirmative action case in
which other employees do not have a strong interest and an argua-
ble legal theory. They should be joined in every case in which
plaintiffs seek more than make-whole relief for identifiable victims.
2. After the Consent Decree Is Entered. After a decree has
been entered, the problem of identifying C is simpler. Forseeability
no longer matters. Nor is there any danger of summoning large
numbers of people who are not concerned about their stake in the
lawsuit. The issue arises after entry of the decree only if an actual
C files a complaint or a motion to intervene. Then the question is
not whether A or B- or the court should have foreseen him, but
whether he has an arguable claim or defense.
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES
The Supreme Court has considered the rights of C in litigated
cases. Courts may issue orders to wrongdoers that substantially af-
fect innocent third parties,97 but the third parties have some sub-
stantive protections against excessively burdensome effects., In
many of these cases, the affected third party or a representative
was a party to the litigation. In some of these cases, the Court has
ordered that exonerated defendants who will be affected by relief
against guilty defendants be retained in the case, "so that full re-
lief could be awarded to the victims."99 The implication is that
such relief should not be granted unless the affected third party is
a party defendant. Where the Court has proceeded without the af-
" See text at notes 36-43.
'7 Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 399-400 (1982); Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 347-48 (1977); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 300-06 (1976).
98 Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C., 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3050-52 (1986) (plural-
ity opinion); Hills, 425 U.S. at 292-96, 298 n.13; Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974);
compare Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
" Zipes 455 U.S. at 400; Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 356 n.43, citing Fed. Rule Civil Proc.
19(a) (quoted in note 123).
[1987:
NONCONSENTING THIRD PARTIES
fected third parties, it has been justifiably criticized.'
The Court has also held that courts can issue "minor and an-
cillary" injunctions against innocent third parties in order to pro-
vide complete relief to plaintiffs.10 But more substantial orders
against innocent third parties are impermissible even if the third
party has been fully heard, because the court's remedial power can
be exercised only on the basis of a violation of law. 0 2
These third-party protections in litigated cases would be illu-
sory if they could be bypassed by a consent decree between the
other two parties to a trilateral dispute. Yet Local Number 93 af-
firmed the entry of just such a bilateral consent decree. Again,
what remains to be seen is what the Court meant when it said the
nonconsenting third party is not bound.
One earlier case provides a partial answer to that question. In
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers,'0 3 the Supreme Court up-
held an arbitrator's award of back pay to male workers laid off
pursuant to a settlement agreement and in violation of the senior-
ity clause in their collective bargaining agreement. The dispute
arose when the employer and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") entered into a conciliation agreement with-
out the consent of the union. W.R. Grace holds that the concilia-
tion agreement did not eliminate the employer's inconsistent obli-
gations under the seniority clause, and that the arbitrator had
power to award back pay under the collective bargaining agree-
ment. At least to that extent, the union was not bound by the con-
ciliation agreement. The opinion says that the employer volunta-
rily took on inconsistent obligations and has only itself to blame
for the resulting expense.104
When the rest of the opinion and the complex procedural his-
tory is considered, W.R. Grace turns out to be a very narrow hold-
ing. The conciliation agreement was not entered as a consent de-
cree; it began as a simple contract. When the union filed its
grievances, the employer and the EEOC sued in federal court for a
declaratory judgment that the union was bound by the conciliation
agreement. They also sought an injunction against arbitration of
any claims inconsistent with the conciliation agreement. The dis-
100 Jones, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.Rev. at 31-35, 62-69 (cited in note 26); Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 213-14 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
101 General Building Contractors Assn. v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982); United States v.
New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 171-78 (1977).
102 General Building Contractors, 458 U.S. at 397-402.
103 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
10I Id. at 770.
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trict court granted summary judgment for the employer,"0 5 and the
union appealed. The Fifth Circuit reversed, because the union had
not agreed to the conciliation agreement and the parties who did
agree had not shown enough to justify an order overriding the se-
niority clause. 10 6 The Fifth Circuit held the seniority provisions of
the conciliation agreement invalid and ordered the company to ar-
bitrate the grievances.10 7
Thus, by the time the grievances went to arbitration, the con-
ciliation agreement had been invalidated by a litigated judicial de-
cree, and the male grievants had been reinstated pursuant to the
court's decision. The grievances sought only back pay for the time
the more senior males were laid off. Nevertheless, one arbitrator
decided that it would be inequitable to require the employer to
provide back pay for the time during which it had been subject to
the district court's injunction ordering it to comply with the concil-
iation agreement. But another arbitrator awarded back pay to
other grievants. The employer again sued in federal court, this
time to overturn the arbitration awards. The district court held
that public policy precluded enforcement of the seniority clause
during the time prior to the Fifth Circuit's decision invalidating
the conciliation agreement. The Fifth Circuit reversed and en-
forced the awards, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
W.R. Grace is an important step in the right direction, but
further steps are needed. The most obvious fact about the case is
that the conciliation agreement greatly complicated the course of
litigation for the union and its members. Their efforts to enforce
their rights Were seriously hindered by the conciliation agreement,
despite the important sense in which the courts ultimately held
that they were not bound. These consequences should be forsee-
able, and relevant, to a court asked to enter such an agreement as
a consent decree.
More important, the Supreme Court's opinion establishes only
a limited sense in which the union and its members were not
bound. First, the opinion relies in part on the need for deference to
arbitrators."0 8 The Court does not say that district courts may,
should, or must decide the same way.
"O' Southbridge Plastics Div., Etc. v. Local 759, Int. U., Etc., 403 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D.
Miss. 1975).
oe Southbridge Plastics Div., Etc., v. Local 759, Etc., 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978).
107 Id. at 917.
108 W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 764-65.
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Second, the Court does not say whether the arbitrators could
have awarded back pay for the duration of the collective bargain-
ing agreement if the conciliation agreement had been upheld. The
Court reviewed the arbitrator's award knowing that the concilia-
tion agreement had already been judicially invalidated and that
the award covered only the period of uncertainty pending
litigation.
Third, the Court relied heavily on the view that the arbitra-
tion award neither required the employer to violate the district
court's injunction nor created "intolerable incentives" for it to do
so.109 It emphasized that courts have the contempt power to en-
force their injunctions, even those issued erroneously. Here the
Court cited Walker v. City of Birmingham,"0 which held that de-
fendants can be punished in criminal contempt for violating an in-
junction that is flagrantly erroneous and unconstitutional.
This reasoning implies that the Court would not have upheld
an award that required or too strongly encouraged the employer to
violate the injunction. This implies more generally that a bilateral
consent decree binds B until it is modified or vacated, and that no
relief to C can require B to violate the decree."' This points to a
very important way in which a consent decree between A and B
binds C: C cannot get equitable relief inconsistent with the consent
decree unless he successfully seeks modification of the decree. This
may mean that the arbitrators could award back pay but not rein-
statement, or that student prayer groups could recover damages
but not the right to hold prayer meetings. If the consent decree
bars equitable relief to C even when C's damage remedy is inade-
quate, C is bound in an important way. To preempt equitable re-
lief for A and limit C to damages, when it might have been the
other way around, is an important accomplishment for the bilat-
eral consent decree." 2
If C cannot get relief inconsistent with the consent decree un-
til the consent decree is modified or vacated, then the most impor-
,o Id. at 769.
110 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967).
m See also Local Number 93, where the Court says that one advantage of a consent
decree is that it tends to "channel litigation concerning the validity and implications of the
consent decree" into the court that entered the decree. 106 S. Ct. at 3076 n.13 (quoting
Brief for National League of Cities et al. as amici curiae). The apparent assumption is that
third parties harmed by the decree can raise their claims or defenses only in the court that
entered the decree, perhaps by intervening and moving to modify.
1" It is no solution to say that B can decide which injunction is more likely correct and
obey that one. He is in criminal contempt if he violates either-even if he violates the erro-
neous one. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); United States v. Mine Work-
ers, 330 U.S. 258, 289-95 (1947); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922).
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tant questions are whether C can move to modify or vacate and
what he must show to obtain relief. The Supreme Court's opinion
in W.R. Grace says nothing about these questions. It was the Fifth
Circuit that invalidated the conciliation agreement at the union's
request; the Supreme Court did not review that judgment. But sev-
eral lower courts have severely limited C's right to have the decree
modified or vacated.11
III. A PROPOSED RULE
In this section I propose two solutions to the problem of con-
sent decrees without consent. The preferred solution is that courts
should refuse to approve any consent decree that limits the argua-
ble legal rights of some C whose existence is known or forseeable to
the court. The alternative solution is that if such decrees are en-
tered, C should remain genuinely unbound, and courts should do
everything possible to eliminate the formal and informal obstacles
to full and fair de novo litigation.
Basic principles of due process require at least the alternative
solution: courts cannot deprive a person of arguable rights without
notice, hearing, and adjudication of the substantive elements of a
claim against him. They cannot approve the decree without hear-
ing from C, and then enforce it against C on the ground that it has
already been approved. Because I believe that entry of the consent
decree commits the court against the rights of C in a way unlikely
to be undone in any attempt at de novo litigation, I prefer the
more stringent solution of refusing to approve the decree.
A. Before Entry of the Consent Decree
The only way to ensure that C's rights are not denied or hin-
dered by a consent decree between A and B is not to enter the
decree. If a decree purports to limit the arguable legal rights of a
nonconsenting party whose interest is known to the court, the
court should refuse to approve it. 1 4 If the court refuses to approve
13 See Cooper, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 157 n.4 (cited in note 2); cases cited in note 57.
114 Some courts have followed this rule, but many have not. Compare Secretary of La-
bor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 695-97 (7th Cir. 1986) (vacating bilateral consent decree
on motion of third-party intervenor); Sanguine, Ltd. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 798 F.2d 389
(10th Cir. 1986) (vacating bilateral consent decree on motion of third-party intervenor); and
Harrisburg Ch. of Am. Civ. Lib. v. Scanlon, 500 Pa. 549, 458 A.2d 1352 (1983) (refusing to
enter bilateral decree in trilateral dispute) with Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 106
S. Ct. 3063 (1986) (approving bilateral consent decree over objections of affected third-party
intervenor).
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the decree, A and B have two principal choices, each with some
variations:
1) They can dismiss the lawsuit and embody their
agreement in a simple contract. They can act pursuant to
the contract until and unless C sues them and wins.
2) They can join C as a defendant under Rule 19.115
They can then negotiate with C and submit a trilateral
consent decree, or they can litigate the case. To get a liti-
gated decree, A must prove all the elements of a claim
that C has no rights in the matter or that C's rights can
be overridden.
The first option makes clear that honoring the rights of C does
not give C power to prevent A and B from settling their own differ-
ences. 1 6 A and B can always make a contract. With or without a
contract, A and B can behave as they wish and force C to sue
them. A school district can exclude student prayer groups, with or
without the agreement of the ACLU, and force the student prayer
groups to sue. An employer can prefer minority applicants, with or
without the agreement of any representative of minority groups,
and force other applicants to sue. In such a suit, the student
prayer groups or the other applicants would be the plaintiffs, and
as such they would typically bear the burden of proving that the
challenged actions violate their rights. 117 But if A and B had
clearly violated some well-established right of C, and the real issue
were some affirmative defense or justification, substantive law
might allocate the burden of persuasion on the critical issue to A
and B." 8
,, Rule 19 authorizes joinder of necessary parties (quoted in note 123).
116 See Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3079 (one party cannot preclude others from
settling their own disputes).
117 An illustrative case is Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
"18 For example, rejecting a white applicant because the white quota has been filled is a
prima facie violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-85 (1976). The employer should bear the burden of proving
the affirmative defense that the quota is a protected affirmative action plan. However, the
Court has held that affirmative action is not merely a protected form of discrimination. In
Title VII terms, it is a "nondiscriminatory" rationale for an employment decision, which the
employer must "articulate." Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1449 (1987).
Under this view, an affirmative action plan negates the charge of discrimination and is not
an affirmative defense. The duty to articulate the nondiscriminatory rationale means that
defendant bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence of a lawful affirmative action
plan to support a judgment for defendant; once that burden has been met, plaintiff bears
the ultimate burden of persuasion. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).
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A and B can generally act or contract for whatever reasons
they wish. They need not find that B has violated A's rights before
making a deal with each other. It follows that they can defend
their bilateral conduct without having to show a past violation, ex-
cept to the extent that the substantive law sometimes makes a vio-
lation or arguable violation of A's rights an element of C's rights.
For example, a plurality of the Supreme Court appears to limit
racial preferences in public employment to cases where there is
reason to believe the employer has discriminated in the past. 19 If
that is the law, white employees challenging such a preference
could force the employer to prove that standard is met.
Professor Fiss notes that private behavior by A and B may
impose substantial hardship on C,'20 and so it may. The question is
not whether such behavior is just or desirable, but whether it is
permissible. As a practical matter, private parties can act as they
will and wait to be sued. It is no different if they embody their
plan in a contract.
A court cannot legitimately act as it will and wait to be sued.
Judicial power can be exercised only on the basis of a violation,121
or the consent of the affected parties. 22 If A and B want to pre-
serve the consent decree or continue the litigation, they must join
C as a defendant. Rule 19 provides that parties "shall" be joined if
they claim an interest that may, "as a practical matter," be im-
paired by the litigation. If the original parties do not join such par-
ties, the court "shall order" that they be joined. 23 The rule ap-
With respect to analogous constitutional claims, a plurality of the Court has said that
defendants must show evidence of past discrimination, and that such a showing leaves
plaintiff with the ultimate burden of persuasion. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848 (plurality opin-
ion) (employer must show "strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action
was necessary"); id. at 1856 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (employer must offer "evidence of its
remedial purpose;" statistical proof is sufficient).
"' Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847 (plurality opinion); id. at 1854 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). Compare Steelworkers v. Weber, 438 U.S. 193, 197, 208 (1979) (private employers may
use quotas "to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job catego-
ries"). The Weber standard applies to Title VII claims against public employers, but the
more demanding Wygant standard applies to equal protection claims against public employ-
ers. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1449-50 n.6 (1987).
120 Fiss, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 12 (cited in note 58).
12' General Building Contractors Assn. v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982); Hills v. Gau-
treaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293-94 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974); Swann v.
Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
122 United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 334 (1964).
123 Rule 19(a) reads in substantial part:
A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive
the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a
party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
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pears to be more ignored than followed,124 but that is part of the
problem. Once a court realizes that a proposed consent decree at-
tempts to limit the arguable rights of third parties, the court
should neither approve the decree nor let the litigation continue
without first complying with Rule 19.
Once C is joined, he must have all the rights of a defendant. A
and B must either secure C's consent or they must prove the pre-
requisites to a litigated judicial order against C. If the substantive
law makes a violation by B a prerequisite to overriding the rights
of C, then C is entitled to defend on the ground that B has not
violated the law. We have already seen that B is not an adequate
representative of C in a trilateral dispute. 125
Thus, in a quota remedy case, plaintiffs would have to prove
that the employer violated Title VII to justify any remedy at all.
But to justify a quota remedy under the Supreme Court's cases,
plaintiffs would also have to prove that the discrimination was so
egregious that no lesser remedy would suffice, that the quota was
not intended merely to achieve racial balance, that it did not "un-
duly trammel" the rights of other workers, and so on.126 The bur-
den of proof would be on plaintiffs, because as between plaintiffs
and the other employees, nothing would have happened to shift
the burden.
The proposed rule sharply distinguishes between private con-
tract and judicial decree. A and B can contract without C's con-
sent, but they cannot get a consent decree without C's consent. C
bears the burden of attacking a private contract between A and B,
but A bears the burden of securing a litigated order against C. The
Supreme Court draws a similar distinction between voluntary and
those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i)
as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed
interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a
party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a
defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.
Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 19(a) (emphasis added).
124 No one has done a study, but other scholars have the same impression. Richard D.
Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1061, 1085 n.116 (1985); John C. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes,
28 Stan. L. Rev. 707, 727 (1976).
125 See text at notes 58-77.
226 United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1064-74 (1987) (plurality opinion); Local
28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C., 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3050-53 (1986) (plurality opinion);
id. at 3054-55 (Powell, J. concurring).
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court-ordered affirmative action plans,127 but it has not seen the
implications of that distinction for third-party rights.
The distinction is not merely formal. The consent decree com-
mits the court to the agreement, and therefore commits the court
against the rights of C. The decree has consequences that will be
difficult to undo, even if the formal rule is that C is unbound and
free to litigate the matter de novo. The consent decree allows A
and B to avoid responsibility for the harm they inflict on C; it pro-
vides the legitimacy of a judicial decision without the reality of a
judicial decision. More political or other pressure will be required
to get B to violate a consent decree than to breach a contract. Only
violation of the consent decree requires B to "defy the court."
The consent decree is immediately enforceable by the court's
contempt power. But contempt for violation of a simple contract
requires an independent suit for breach, a discretionary judicial
decision to order B to specifically perform, and violation of the
specific performance decree. Even with a procedural rule that per-
mits collateral attack, an outstanding consent decree may limit C
to damages for any violation of his rights. But with a contract, the
competing rights of C would provide an arguable reason to limit A
to damages instead of granting specific performance. Indeed, a con-
tract requiring C to violate B's rights might be void for illegality.128
When C files suit to attack the consent decree, judicial econ-
omy will often suggest that the case be assigned to the judge who
approved the decree. He may know something about the case as a
result of ruling on contested motions before the settlement. But
that means C is effectively in the position of arguing that the judge
should not have approved the decree in the first place. Even with a
procedural rule that permitted collateral attack, C would have to
argue that the judge's approval of the decree violated C's rights. C
would not be in a promising forum for a fair trial on that claim.
All things considered, A gets substantial advantages from a ju-
dicial decree. All the reasons why plaintiffs prefer consent decrees
to simple contracts are reasons why consent decrees more effec-
tively limit C's rights. If A wants those advantages, he must either
elicit all the relevant consents, or he must bear the burden of prov-
ing his case.
Dean Geoffrey Stone has suggested that the consent decree be
entered but that it remain vulnerable to a lawsuit like any other
act of government. He has further suggested that my error is to
127 Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1451-52 n.8 (1987). See also cases cited in note 38.
128 See, for example, Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 77 (1982).
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treat C as a defendant who is a target of the decree. In Stone's
view, C is a potential plaintiff: if he objects to a government act, he
must assert his own claim and file his own lawsuit.129 This point
has force when C is remote from the dispute and neither the court
nor the parties have reason to anticipate his objection. I think this
approach is unrealistic in the cases I am discussing, where every-
one understands that a central purpose of the decree is to limit the
rights of C.
Stone's suggestion that the consent decree is like any other act
of government is also relevant to our disagreement. As Professor
Resnik demonstrates, most consent decrees reflect no judgment of
any government official. A and B draft and approve the decree;
court approval is a mere rubber stamp. 130 Sometimes the court
holds a fairness hearing, and occasionally the court rejects a decree
or insists that it be amended.' 31 But often, the court signs the de-
cree the day it is filed. 32 This elevation of private agreement to
judicial decree-or this delegation of judicial power to private par-
ties-is acceptable as between A and B. It is part of what they
consent to. It is not acceptable with respect to C, because C did
not consent. If as a practical matter the decree is entered on the
say-so of A and B, with no independent judgment by the court,
then there is no basis to treat it like an act of government and
force C to prove that the government acted illegally.
Even the simple contract between A and B can cause serious
problems for C if the courts defer to the contract. W.R. Grace il-
lustrates the point. But much of the difficulty in W.R. Grace re-
sulted from the district court's willingness to specifically enforce
the contract without considering C's rights. That approach would
be clearly improper under the principles urged here. C may bear
the burden of proving that the contract violates his rights, but he
is entitled to a full and fair chance to litigate that claim.
B. After Entry of the Consent Decree
If the Supreme Court adheres to its ruling in Local Number
219 Geoffrey Stone, comments made at the University of Chicago Legal Forum sympo-
sium, Nov. 15, 1986.
130 Resnik, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 98-99 (cited in note 67).
'31 See, for example, Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981); Kasper v.
Board of Election Commissioners, 814 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1987). Rejection converts a settle-
ment into an immediately appealable order opposed by both sides, so orders rejecting con-
sent decrees are probably disproportionately reported.
132 Maimon Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees
and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 Duke L.J. 887, 913.
103]
134 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
93, bilateral consent decrees will continue to be entered in trilat-
eral disputes. Even if the rule proposed here is adopted, courts will
sometimes approve consent decrees that override the arguable
rights of some nonconsenting C. A and B may not know about C,
or they may conceal his existence from the court. The court may
not realize that C has an interest in the matter, or the court may
conclude that C's interest is not even arguably protected. The
court may misunderstand the judicial duty to order that C be
joined, or even defy that duty. What is the result if and when C
attacks the consent decree?
The only rule consistent with due process is that the consent
decree has no effect on C's rights. If the Supreme Court is serious
about its assurance that C is not bound by the decree,133 C may
fully litigate all the issues that are logically prerequisite to the
claim that his rights may be overridden. If C intervenes in the
case, the court should vacate all parts of the decree that affect C
and restore the case to the docket. A would be seeking a court or-
der limiting C's rights, and thus A would usually bear the burden
of proof. The case would start over, and C would have full rights of
trial and appeal. The court vacated a consent decree on precisely
these grounds in Sanguine, Ltd. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior.' The
Fifth Circuit apparently allowed this kind of de novo litigation of
the conciliation agreement in W.R. Grace;'35 it is not clear whether
the court would have proceeded in the same way if the agreement
had been entered as a consent decree.
Full and fair litigation may not require trial. Motions to dis-
miss and motions for summary judgment would be available, sub-
ject to the usual standards. And of course the case might settle
again, resulting in a new trilateral consent decree, or in a voluntary
dismissal and a contract between A and B.
Full and fair litigation would require diligent judicial efforts to
prevent the decree from having informal effects. Judicial reluc-
tance to reopen the case would be recognized as a defect in the
system, something to be resisted by both the trial judge and re-
viewing courts. The consent decree itself could not raise a pre-
sumption, shift the burden of proof, or be taken as evidence of any
of the relevant facts-not even a violation by B. The decree does
not collaterally estop C, because C was not a party.136 It is not ad-
133 Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3079.
134 798 F.2d 389, 392 (10th Cir. 1986).
135 Southbridge Plastics Division, etc. v. Local 759, etc., 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978).
131 See cases cited in note 9.
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missible as evidence, because it is not probative of anything. We
have already seen that a bilateral consent decree in a trilateral dis-
pute lacks all the usual guarantees of justice or efficiency. 137
In some cases, it will be appropriate for the court to vacate the
final judgment but reinstate the consent decree as a preliminary
injunction, thus preserving the status quo pending litigation or set-
tlement of C's claim or defense. 13 8 Unfortunately, this procedure
increases the risk that judicial inertia will deprive C of a fair hear-
ing. A court that enters the consent decree as a preliminary injunc-
tion should be alert to that risk. Such a preliminary order should
not be automatic: A should be required to make at least the usual
showing of probable success on the merits and balance of irrepara-
ble injury.'39 Where the balance is close, preliminarily enforcing
the decree may be less disruptive and therefore less harmful. But
there is also a countervailing factor: where A and B should have
foreseen C's claim or defense and failed to join him, there should
be a presumption against preliminary relief that affects C.
It is important to conduct this litigation in a way that makes
A and B at least somewhat worse off than if they had joined C in
the first place. Otherwise, they have little incentive to think about
potential Cs and join them as parties. If there is no penalty for
ignoring C before the decree, and if there may be judicial inertia in
favor of the decree once it is entered, A and B have substantial
reason to conceal C's existence from the court, get the decree ap-
proved, and take their chances later.
The strongest incentive may be to hold that A and B are
bound to each other even though they are not bound to C. A would
be bound by his release of claims against B, and B would be liable
either to perform the consent decree or pay compensation to A.
For reasons already discussed, this result would be quite unattrac-
tive to A and B;140 they would usually join C rather than risk it. An
absolute rule is not required; a substantial risk of this result would
be sufficient. I would propose the following rule: where A and B
knew of C's existence and failed to join him, and C eventually
"" See text at notes 58-77.
,18 See United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 664 F.2d 435, 452-53 (5th Cir. 1981) (Gee,
J., concurring in part).
"I See, e.g., American Hasp. Supply v. Hospital Products Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593-94
(7th Cir. 1986); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com'n v. Nat. Football, 634 F.2d 1197,
1200-01 (9th Cir. 1980); John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91
Harv. L. Rev. 525 (1978). For a review of the Supreme Court's cases, see Laycock, Modern
American Remedies 401-02 (cited in note 78).
"I See text at notes 76-81.
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prevails, A and B should presumptively be held to the consent de-
cree as against each other. They can be released from their mutual
obligations where holding them to the decree would harm C, or
where the hardship to A or B is exceptional.
An alternative is to hold A and B liable for C's attorneys' fees
if C succeeds in having the decree vacated. This would be simpler
to administer but perhaps harder to justify: C would have incurred
most of the same attorneys' fees if he had been joined before the
decree. Awarding him fees only for the extra step of getting the
decree reopened may not give A and B a sufficient incentive join
him in the first place. Another weak incentive would be a presump-
tion against preliminary relief after a consent decree is vacated at
the request of C.
Professor McCoid and others have suggested enforcing Rule
19(c) through Rule 11.141 Rule 19(c) requires plaintiffs to state the
names of third parties with interests that might be affected and
who have not been joined,142 but the rule appears to be widely ig-
nored. Rule 11 requires pleaders to certify that their pleading is
well-grounded in fact and law, and authorizes sanctions for falsely
certified pleadings. 4 3 Rule 11 could be amended to require certifi-
cation that the pleader has complied with Rule 19(c); violation
would trigger the existing sanction provisions. This would be a use-
ful incentive to comply.
Providing for appropriate incentives to join C before decree is
a detail that could be worked out if the basic proposal were
adopted. In the most egregious cases, C's existence will be obvious
to the court no matter what A and B do, and A and B's incentives
will be less important. If the decree is entered without notice to C,
a conscientious judicial effort to permit fair litigation, unbiased by
the previous entry of the decree, would solve a substantial part of
the existing problem.
IV. RULES PROPOSED By OTHERS
Several courts and commentators have recognized the anomaly
of a bilateral consent decree that operates trilaterally. They have
proposed solutions less effective than those proposed here. Some of
these solutions appear designed to rationalize the result that C is
141 McCoid, 28 Stan. L. Rev. at 727-28 (cited in note 124). This proposal is endorsed in
Freer, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1085 n.116 (cited in note 124), and Jones, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. at 84-86 (cited in note 26).
142 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 19(c).
1 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 11.
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generally bound; others appear to genuinely seek a middle ground
that gives C some protection but not full litigation rights. None is
procedurally fair to C.
A. The Hearing on Fairness or Reasonableness
Courts may give C a right to be heard on the fairness or rea-
sonableness of the decree, but not a right to withhold consent or
insist on full litigation. 144 Such a right may be accorded before or
after entry of the decree, but it is most commonly accorded before.
The obvious model here is that of class members objecting to a
class action settlement.145 C can explain his objections and ask the
court to take account of his interests, but the court remains free to
approve the decree largely on the authority of the class representa-
tive's consent.
This procedure assumes that C's position is like that of ob-
jecting class members. But the analogy is false. Objecting class
members are represented by the class representative; the court
must find as a fact that the representation is adequate; 146 and the
adequacy of representation can be independently attacked at the
settlement hearing and even collaterally attacked thereafter. 147 If
the class representative has a serious conflict of interest with part
of the class, that part of the class is not bound. 48 On the other
hand, if the representation is adequate, the efficacy of the class
action device depends on a rule that absent class members cannot
continue to litigate individually. Accordingly, adequate representa-
tion in a certified class action, accompanied by individual notice
and a chance to be heard on the reasonableness of the settlement,
has been held to satisfy due process. I would require both adequate
representation and individual notice where feasible, but everyone
4' Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984); Gautreaux v. Pierce,
690 F.2d 616, 629-31 (7th Cir. 1982); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579, 584 (6th
Cir. 982); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 552-56 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds as Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Dennison v.
City of Los Angeles, etc., 658 F.2d 694, 695-696 (9th Cir. 1981); Patterson v. Newspaper &
Mail Del. U. of N.Y. & Vic., 514 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1975); Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F.
Supp. 1292, 1321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Schwarzchild, 1984 Duke L.J. at 919-36 (cited in note
132). Schwarzchild collects additional cases at 923-25.
141 See Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(e).
146 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(a)(4).
"4 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Air Line Stew. & S. Ass'n Loc. 550 v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir.
1973).
148 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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agrees that at least adequate representation is required. 49
As we have seen, the adequate representation that is essential
to class action settlements is wholly absent in the case of C. The
fact that we limit absent class members to a hearing on fairness or
reasonableness is no precedent whatever for limiting C to the same
thing.
The Supreme Court said in Local Number 93 that a reasona-
bleness hearing is all that due process requires before a consent
decree is entered. 5 ' But that holding depends on the Court's hold-
ing that the consent decree does not bind the union. The Court
explicitly declined to hold that a reasonableness hearing before en-
try of the consent decree settles the matter forever. Taken at face
value, the decision is about timing: full and fair litigation will come
after the decree is entered instead of before.
The Court also held that a reasonableness hearing was suffi-
cient in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines.'5' The result in Zipes is
defensible, but only on the basis of distinctions that the Court does
not yet appear to have made. In Zipes there was a litigated deter-
mination that the employer's refusal to employ mothers violated
the law. 52 While litigating that issue, the employer faced the risk
of full liability for back pay. So long as it faced that risk, and so
long as no collateral issue introduced a conflict of interest, the em-
ployer's interests were sufficiently aligned with those of its child-
less employees that it is plausible to say the childless employees
were adequately represented. I would let the union or childless em-
loyees intervene to defend the unlawful policy if they wished, but I
would not let them attack the judgment after it was entered.
After litigation resolved the liability issues, the parties settled
the remedies issues. The settlement required reinstatement of
identified victims with rightful place seniority and substantial back
pay. It did not require a quota. Reinstatement with rightful place
seniority may limit rights under the collective bargaining agree-
ment, but it does not discriminate against anyone on the basis of
sex. Under the Supreme Court's cases, reinstatement with rightful
place seniority is virtually an entitlement: discretion to deny such
relief is very narrow, and protecting the expectancies of incum-
149 See generally Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational
Device?, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 459.
150 106 S. Ct. at 3079.
5- 455 U.S. 385, 400 (1982). I should disclose that I played a minor role as counsel for
the plaintiff class.
152 Id. at 389.
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bents is not a sufficient reason to deny rightful place seniority.153
With respect to that issue, there was not much the union could
say, and a reasonableness hearing might have been as effective as
full litigation rights.
Still, it is plain that the employer did not have the same in-
centives as the union to litigate whether some exceptional circum-
stance required that rightful place seniority be denied. And once
the settlement fixed the employer's back pay liability at three mil-
lion dollars, the employer did not have the same incentives as the
union to litigate whether individual plaintiffs were really victims of
discrimination. The union should have been entitled to fully liti-
gate these issues, although the relevant substantive law and the
litigated finding of discrimination would force the union to bear
the burden of proof on each of them.""
B. Requiring Timely Intervention by C
Courts may require C to intervene in the litigation, and hold
that C is barred if he does not intervene promptly. Several courts
have denied motions to intervene on grounds of timeliness. 55 Some
of these courts might allow the untimely intervenor to file a sepa-
rate suit and litigate the issue anew. 56 But there are also decisions
,53 Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 773-79 (1976).
,54 The Court explicitly allocates the burden of proof to defendants on the issue of
identifying individual victims. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 357-62 (1977);
Franks, 424 U.S. at 772-73 (1976). Franks appears to require that those objecting to rightful
place seniority bear the burden of persuasion on the issue of exceptional circumstances. Id.
at 770-79. See also id. at 777 n. 37 (rightful place seniority is "presumptively necessary").
I' NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365-66 (1973); County of Orange v. Air Califor-
nia, 799 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. City of Chicago, 796 F.2d 205 (7th Cir.
1986); Corley v. Jackson Police Dept., 755 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1985); Reeves v. Wilkes, 754
F.2d 965 (11th Cir. 1985); National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 744 F.2d 963 (3d Cir.
1984); United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1516-19 (11th Cir. 1983); Stotts v.
Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1982); Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 (1st
Cir. 1980); Liddell v. Board of Educ. of City of St. Louis, 98 F.R.D. 548 (E.D. Mo. 1983);
McPherson v. School District No. 186, 33 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 978 (C.D. Ill. 1981); Alaniz v.
California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289, 294-95 (N.D. Cal. 1976). But see Howard v.
McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 959-61 (11th Cir. 1986); Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dept. of
Interior, 736 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1984). Since Howard v. McLucas, the Eleventh Circuit has
awarded fees against another group of untimely intervenors. See Reeves v. Harrell, 791 F.2d
1481 (11th Cir. 1986).
116 NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. at 363, 368; Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.
1986); County of Orange, 799 F.2d at 538-39; National Wildlife Federation, 744 F.2d at 969-
71; Jefferson County, 720 F.2d at 1517-19; McAleer v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F.
Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976); Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900, 901-04 (1984) (Rehnquist
and Brennan, J.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In Dunn, the parties to a federal
consent decree asked the federal court to enjoin state court litigation asserting third party
rights inconsistent with the consent decree. The federal court of appeals let the state suit
103]
140 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
holding that separate suits are barred as collateral attacks on the
consent decree. 57 In circuits with both of these rules, 58 interven-
tion is the exclusive remedy and intervention is often barred as
untimely.159
Although couched in terms of timeliness, these are in effect
holdings that C need not be heard, served, or notified: he is bound
by a consent decree if he happened to hear about it before it was
entered. Some affirmative action cases have gone further. Interven-
tion has been barred as untimely even when the motion to inter-
vene was filed as soon as the original parties proposed a consent
decree providing for quotas. 160 These courts reasoned that other
employees knew a discrimination suit was pending and should
have foreseen that quotas might be requested. In at least one of
proceed, holding that third parties are not bound by consent decrees. The state court de-
fendants will probably now argue that the state court should defer to the consent decree
anyway. See Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (defendants must obey
federal consent decree despite contrary state court order) (dictum).
'17 Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 2177, order
granting cert. amended, 107 S. Ct. 3182 (1987); Samayoa by Samayoa v. Chicago Bd. of
Educ., 798 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1986); Deveraux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985); Thag-
gard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982); Dennison v. City of Los Angeles, etc.,
658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981).
158 Compare Deveraux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985) (independent suit barred
as collateral attack) with Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980) (intervention
barred as untimely); Corley v. Jackson Police Dept., 755 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1985) (interven-
tion barred as untimely) with Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982)
(independent suit barred as collateral attack); Samayoa by Samayoa v. Chicago Bd. of
Educ., 798 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1986) (independent suit barred as collateral attack) with
United States v. City of Chicago, 796 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1986) (intervention barred as un-
timely) and County of Orange v. Air California, 799 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986) (intervention
barred as untimely) with Dennison v. City of Los Angeles, etc., 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981)
(independent suit barred as collateral attack). County of Orange says that the untimely
intervenor will not be barred in future litigation. 799 F.2d at 538-39. But the opinion does
not cite Dennison; future litigation will have to resolve the conflict between the holding in
Dennison and the dictum in County of Orange. There are also Seventh Circuit cases that
protect the rights of nonconsenting parties and appear to be in tension with Samayoa and
United States v. City of Chicago. See Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1986) (de-
scribed in note 156); Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1986). For
more extensive analysis of the "pincer movement" created by the timeliness and collateral
attack rules, see generally, Cooper, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 155 (cited in note 2).
See also National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 744 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1984). C partici-
pated in the first case between A and B as an amicus but not as a party. Later it moved to
intervene; intervention was denied as untimely, and C did not appeal. Still later, C filed its
own lawsuit against B. The court of appeals held C bound by its partial participation in the
first case and by its failure to appeal the denial of intervention. But the court said that such
results should be unusual, and that Cs should generally not be bound by decrees between A
and B. Id. at 968-72.
See generally Cooper, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 155 (cited in note 2).
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579, 581, 585 (6th Cir. 1982); Culbreath v.
Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1980).
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these cases, the court ordered that notice of the proposed consent
decree be posted at the workplace." 1 But that was apparently for
the exclusive benefit of minority employees who might want to ob-
ject that the settlement achieved too little. White intervenors re-
sponding to the notice were told that they were too late.162 These
holdings are in tension with Supreme Court precedent on timeli-
ness of intervention by civil rights plaintiffs.16 3
My favorite timeliness holding is McPherson v. School Dis-
trict No. 186.164 A consent decree provided for desegregation of a
faculty. Seven years later, the court ordered that teachers be laid
off on the basis of race rather than seniority. Twelve days after
that, the union moved to intervene. Held: untimely. 65 The union
should have foreseen seven years before that desegregation might
interfere with seniority. In the alternative, the union had no inter-
est.166 Because the case was about desegregation rather than em-
ployment, even the layoff order had little effect on the union's
rights. So an effect too trivial to confer standing should have been
foreseen seven years before. Both holdings cannot be right; in fact,
both are wrong.
A timeliness standard is defective even if fairly administered.
It leads to speculative litigation over how much C knew and when
he knew it. By failing to clearly allocate responsibility for bringing
C into the litigation, this standard leads to strategic game playing,
in which A and B refuse to join C as an additional defendant and C
ignores the proceeding and tries to preserve his ignorance.
There is no need to create these unproductive incentives. It is
plaintiff's responsibility to join all parties that he seeks to bind by
the litigation. One function of serving a complaint and a summons
is to make clear that defendant knew about the litigation and knew
he might be affected by it; these issues never need be litigated
again. We dispense with the certainty provided by formal service
only in the emergency conditions that support temporary re-
straining orders. 161
The absurdity of the timeliness cases is revealed by consider-
"'1 Stotts, 679 F.2d at 587 (Martin, J. dissenting).
162 Id. at 581 (majority opinion).
' See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977) (member of plaintiff
class can intervene after judgment when class representative accepts favorable individual
judgment on merits and fails to appeal denial of class certification).
164 33 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 978 (C.D. Ill. 1981).
165 Id. at 978-81.
16 Id. at 981.
16' See Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 65(b); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
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ing a similar procedure in bilateral litigation. We would not let A
file a complaint and a proposed decree without serving B, call a
press conference and wait for a few newspaper stories, "consent"
that the court enter the decree against B, and then say B is barred
because he knew about the case and failed to intervene. That pro-
cedure makes no more sense when A and B consent for C than
when A consents for B.
A best knows what relief he is seeking, and if that relief will
directly interfere with C's arguable claim of right, A is seeking re-
lief against C just as much as he is seeking relief against B. A will
typically know about C at least as soon as C knows about A's law-
suit and the requested relief-usually long before. It is A's respon-
sibility to join C. If A does not join him, Rule 19 requires the court
to order that he be joined.16 C has no similar duty to intervene. 1 9
Rule 19 imposes a duty; Rule 24 creates only an opportunity. The
plaintiff and the court should not be allowed to ignore their re-
sponsibilities under Rule 19, and then oppose intervention or sub-
sequent litigation on grounds of timeliness.
It is true that Rule 24 requires that motions to intervene be
timely. But Rule 24 does not excuse the duty of the plaintiff and
the court under Rule 19. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule
24 indicate that the primary purpose of nonstatutory intervention
as of right is "to entitle an absentee, purportedly represented by a
party, to intervene in the action if he could establish with fair
probability that the representation was inadequate.' 170 This appli-
cation of Rule 24 fills a gap in Rule 19: if the absentee is repre-
sented by a party, and if the parties have no reason to question the
adequacy of the representation, there is presumably no obligation
to join the absentee under Rule 19. Enforcement of the Rule 24
timeliness requirement in that context does not eviscerate Rule 19.
The drafters of Rule 24 apparently contemplated that plaintiff
would join all defendants against whom he sought relief, and that
if such a defendant were initially overlooked, he would be joined
under Rules 19 or 20.1"1 Thus, the Advisory Notes do not discuss
18' Rule 19(a) is quoted in note 123.
169 Chase National Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934) ("The law does not im-
pose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the burden of voluntary intervention
in a suit to which he is a stranger.... Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceed-
ing, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered therein will not affect
his legal rights."). But see Provident Bank v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114 (1968) ("[It
might be argued" to the contrary, but the issue was not presented).
170 Advisory Committee Notes on 1966 Amendments to Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 24.
171 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 20 provides for permissive joinder.
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the case where an intervenor seeks to oppose a decree that will
directly affect him and no party can be expected to represent him.
Barring such intervention as untimely eviscerates Rule 19; A has
much to gain and little to lose by refusing to join C. The court may
succumb to similar incentives: the docket can be cleared, and sym-
pathy-arousing plaintiffs can be helped, if the court takes no initia-
tive under Rule 19 and rejects a subsequent motion to intervene as
untimely.172
There is a more fundamental difference between the applica-
tion of Rule 24 as contemplated by the Advisory Committee and
the cases barring intervention by nonconsenting third parties. In-
adequate representation can be raised after judgment,173 so that
denial of an untimely motion to intervene merely postpones the
issue. There are practical problems with letting an unrepresented
party file a second suit, but at some point these become less signifi-
cant than the practical problems of letting an intervenor disrupt
an earlier lawsuit that is nearing resolution. 74 Striking a balance
between these competing interests is quite different from holding
that C is barred forever by his failure to timely intervene in a case
where A should have named him as a defendant. But in circuits
that bar independent suits by C, that is precisely the effect of de-
nying C's motion to intervene.175
C. Requiring C to Seek Modification of the Decree
Courts may enter the decree and treat any later objection by C
as a motion to vacate or modify. Some courts have suggested such
an approach without exploring the details.7 6 A mild version of this
approach would merely shift to C the burden of persuasion by a
preponderance of the evidence, while recognizing that C's rights
had not been determined in the original litigation. In a more ex-
treme version, the court could look to the precedents on modifica-
tion of decrees. Those precedents are inconsistent, 77 but the most
,72 An example is Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 25 n.14 (1st Cir. 1980), which held
that white employees need not be joined under Rule 19 in suit seeking quota remedy, and
that even if they should have been joined, failure to do so does not excuse the timeliness
requirement for intervention.
'71 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Air Line Stew. & S. Ass'n Loc. 550 v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973); Gonzalez v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir.
1973).
An example of such balancing is NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 368-69 (1973).
175 See cases cited in note 158.
176 Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 22; Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982).
177 See Laycock, Modern American Remedies at 1019-54 (cited in note 78); Timothy
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commonly cited case requires that the party seeking substantial
modifications show a significant change of circumstances and sub-
stantial hardship. 7 s
Whatever modification precedent the court looks to, it is
wholly inappropriate to hold nonconsenting third parties to the
same standard as consenting parties. If C is bound by the decree
until modified, and if his motion for modification is governed by
the same standard governing a similar motion by A or B, it is non-
sense to say that C is not bound. C would be bound to exactly the
same extent as A and B.
V. THE COSTS OF INCLUDING C
There are costs to insisting on consent from all parties whose
rights may be overridden by the settlement. Concern over this cost
is most often expressed in the complaint that settlement becomes
more difficult. 179 Some of these difficulties are inherent in trilateral
negotiations. Others arise only when C is a large class.
A. The Nature of Trilateral Negotiations
Unanimity is more elusive among three parties than among
two. But the cost of procuring C's consent inheres in the situation.
It is not a cost created by recognizing C's right to consent. If the
agreement cannot be implemented without overriding the arguable
rights of C, A and B's consent is illusory. We can pretend that it
settles something by ignoring C's rights, but we are only pretend-
ing. A decree that overrides C's rights without the consent of C is
not a consent decree.
Requiring the consent of all three parties makes it impossible
for two parties to externalize costs to the third. Professor Ruther-
glen makes this point-although somewhat in reverse-in discuss-
ing affirmative action cases. He says the white employees have no
reason to settle, because they have nothing to lose. 8 ' That is, they
are not accused of wrongdoing and they face no risk of liability for
back pay. The only issue for them is the extent to which their job
opportunities will be limited to help remedy the employer's dis-
Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal
Courts, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1101 (1986).
178 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
' Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3077 n.13; Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 22; Schwarzchild,
1984 Duke L.J. at 921-23 (cited in note 132). See also Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 69.
80 George Rutherglen, Procedures and Preferences: Remedies for Employment Dis-
crimination, 5 Rev. Lit. 73, 115-16 (1986).
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crimination against minorities, and they have no reason to consent
to bear the cost of the employer's wrong. That is not quite right,
but to the extent it is right, it highlights the way these settlements
force the innocent to pay for defendant's wrongdoing.
If it were true that a litigated decree could not limit white job
opportunities, then it would be true that white workers face no liti-
gation risks and would never agree to anything. But the premise is
not true. The Supreme Court has held that quotas may be imposed
in some litigated cases, and it has begun to formulate rules gov-
erning their imposition.18 ' Thus, as Rutherglen also notes, white
employees do face litigation risks, and they may agree to some
quota to avoid the risk of a more severe one. 182
The parties can assess the chances of a litigated quota remedy,
and the likely severity of the quota if ordered, just as they assess
the chances of a damage judgment and the likely amount of dam-
ages. White employees who faced a substantial risk of a 30 percent
minority quota at trial might settle the case for 20 percent quota.
Or they might agree to a 30 percent quota in exchange for a cash
payment from the employer. Thus, Rutherglen's objection reduces
to the obvious point that few defendants will consent to the maxi-
mum liability that might be imposed if they go to trial. There is
nothing illegitimate, racist, or selfish about white employees nego-
tiating the same way. If plaintiffs want the full 30 percent, they
should prove their case and bear the risks of trial like any other
litigant.
The Supreme Court held in Local Number 93 that plaintiffs
and the employer, may agree to more relief than the court could
order.183 Even with all parties participating, they may agree on a
creative form of relief that the court could not have ordered. But
the affected parties will not agree on a 40 percent quota in case
where the most a court could order is a 30 percent quota. Settle-
ment relief that exceeds what a court could order is one more
product of letting A and B negotiate the rights of C.
B. Multiple Third Parties and the Problem of Representation
Another source of difficulty in trilateral negotiations is that
they may involve more than three parties. C may be a group of
1,000 unorganized individuals with no obvious representative.
,'8 See text at notes 36-43.
182 Rutherglen, 5 Rev. Lit. at 116-17.
's' 106 S. Ct. at 3077-79.
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They cannot all participate in the litigation, and if each of them
must consent individually, there may be insuperable holdout
problems.
Sometimes these problems are an avoidable consequence of
defining the original litigation too broadly. In Harrisburg ACLU,
the ACLU sued state education officers as well as some school dis-
tricts, hoping to resolve the matter for every school in the state in
a single decree. If we take seriously the procedural rights of the
student prayer groups, we must join every student prayer group in
the state, or at least an adequate representative. But the ACLU
could also sue one school district and the local student prayer
group, and rely on stare decisis rather than res judicata to influ-
ence resolution of the same issue elsewhere.
In affirmative action litigation, the problem of multiple parties
is unavoidable. If the court is to consider a quota remedy in a fac-
tory with 100 minority employees and 900 other employees, there
are at least 1,001 parties. Even this figure omits future applicants,
but only a guardian ad litem can adequately represent them. With
incumbents, it may be possible to find some more appropriate
representative.
1. Who Should Be Notified?
a. Incumbent Workers. Assuming that plaintiffs must sue
the other employees or a representative, the initial question is who
must be served with a summons. The answer is all employees who
might be affected by a quota remedy. To see why, we must first
consider the alternatives of suing the union or designated repre-
sentatives of a class of white employees.
If there is a collective bargaining agreement, the union is an
adequate representative for employees claiming rights under the
agreement. The most common example is seniority rights. But em-
ployees opposing a quota remedy also have rights under Title
VII,184 and if the employer is a governmental unit, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.185 The union's authority as exclusive bargaining
representative under the National Labor Relations Act does not
give it power to surrender individual rights under the civil rights
laws.186 To the contrary, the union is regulated by those very
84 Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C., 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3050-53 (1986) (plu-
rality opinion); id. at 3054-57 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 3060-61 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). See also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-85 (1976).
,' Wygant v. Board of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
186 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-54, 58 n.19 (1974).
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laws.18 7
One tempting solution in the unionized sector is to certify a
defendant class and appoint the union as class representative. 188
But that solution assumes that the union can legitimately re-
present only the white workers, which is not true. The class repre-
sentative under Rule 23 assumes a fiduciary duty to the class
members that would conflict with the union's statutory duty of fair
representation to all its members.18 e Sometimes the union is fully
committed to the anti-quota position and would adequately re-
present workers opposed to a quota. Local Number 93 is an exam-
ple of this scenario. But certifying the union as a class representa-
tive would legally obligate it to disregard the interests of its
minority constituents. That is at least an undesirable result, and
probably an illegal result. White and minority union members in
quota disputes are like the opponents and supporters of the ra-
cially restrictive covenant in Hansberry v. Lee:190 no class repre-
sentative can represent both sides. The Second Circuit recently
recognized a similar problem: a union could not adequately re-
present both its retired members and its active members in litiga-
tion with a bankrupt employer seeking to reject the collective bar-
gaining agreement. 19'
Even so, the union may sometimes be the key to a solution.
The union may be able to mediate or negotiate a compromise ac-
ceptable to all its members, or to so many of them that any dis-
senters can represent themselves without making the litigation un-
manageable. Such solutions can emerge informally and by
acquiescence. But they should not be legally imposed, either by
certifying the union as a class representative or by treating the
union's consent as binding all the conflicting interests among the
membership.
With respect to incumbent employees whose names and ad-
dresses are known, the only solution is to notify them all individu-
ally and give them an opportunity to defend the action. That is the
apparent holding of Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.' 92 Even
187 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1982).
"' Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(a) authorizes suits against a representative on behalf of a
class.
189 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steele v. L. & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944);
compare Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (class representative cannot represent those
who support, and also those who oppose, enforcement of racial covenant in deed).
190 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
19! In re Century Brass Products, Inc., 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1986).
.92 339 U.S. 306, 318-20 (1950).
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when the number of defendants is very large, due process is not
satisfied by appointing a representative who proceeds without the
knowledge of identifiable individuals among the represented.
The court might seek to avoid this step by certifying a defend-
ant class and appointing individual members of the class to re-
present it. A number of lower court cases hold that Mullane is in-
applicable to class actions for injunctive relief. 193 I find these
opinions unpersuasive, 9 4 but I assume they will be followed.
Even if plaintiff class actions without notice are constitutional,
it is a far more difficult step to apply this principle to a defendant
class of blue collar workers.'95 Plaintiff class representatives are
self-appointed, which is not ideal, but at least they have expressed
interest in the case and they have hired a lawyer. Defendant class
representatives appointed by the plaintiffs or the court may not be
willing to serve, may not know how to find a lawyer, and probably
cannot pay the lawyer. Successfully resisting a quota remedy will
not create an immediate pool of money out of which to pay a con-
tingent fee. Notifying five randomly selected workers that they are
the class representatives is unworkable and constitutionally insuffi-
cient to bind the class. It may be necessary to eventually certify a
class for settlement purposes, but the case must begin with indi-
vidual notice to every incumbent employee who might be disad-
vantaged by the quota.
b. Applicants. Representation problems are much more se-
vere in the case of hiring quotas. It may sometimes make sense to
notify persons with pending job applications, and to certify repre-
sentatives of the class of all present and future job applicants who
might be affected by the quota. But status as an applicant for work
with a particular employer is often short-lived, and an applicant's
stake with any particular employer is often small. The court can
,91 The best of these opinions is Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 508 F.2d 239,
254-57 (3d Cir. 1975). Other examples include Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Intern.
Ass'n, etc., 565 F.2d 1364, 1373-74 (6th Cir. 1977); Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167,
1184-87 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1975).
" Wetzel holds that due process is satisfied if the named plaintiff is an adequate rep-
resentative. 508 F.2d at 256-57. The opinion cites dictum in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32,
40-42 (1940). But Hansberry held only that adequate representation is necessary. It had no
occasion to consider whether adequate representation is sufficient where individual notice is
possible or feasible. The facts involved egregious conflict of interest; the decision predates
Mullane; and notice was not at issue. The Court offered some rationales for class actions,
such as binding parties who could not be found and avoiding delay caused by the old rule
that actions abate if any party dies. None of these reasons suggest a need to dispense with
notice to class members who can be located.
19' See the discussion of the problems with defendant class actions in Hensoin v. East
Lincoln Township, 814 F.2d 410, 414-17 (7th Cir. 1987).
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notify current applicants, but it certainly cannot rely on them to
represent a class. Current applicants arguably, and future appli-
cants certainly, are like the remaindermen in Mullane.19 6 They do
not have to be notified individually, but if they are to be bound,
the court must appoint a guardian ad litem to represent their
interests. 197
In Mullane, the guardian could be paid out of trust funds in
which the remaindermen had an interest. There is no comparable
source of funding for a guardian for future applicants. But the em-
ployer may be willing to pay a guardian for future applicants, to
ensure that the decree is really final. Such an arrangement would
require careful judicial supervision to ensure the independence of
the guardian and his counsel; the court should focus on this risk in
assessing the adequacy of representation under Rule 23. It would
probably help insulate the guardian and his lawyer if the employer
paid a fund into court and did not receive bills directly. But the
arrangement has potential benefits for all sides, and the ethical
rules do not preclude it.""
It may be that no one is willing to pay a guardian ad litem for
future applicants. In that case, the solution is simple. They do not
have to be notified, and they are not bound. 99 The legality of the
hiring quota will be litigated if and when some future applicant
cares enough to file a lawsuit. If and when that time comes, he may
be certified as a representative of all future applicants so that
others will be bound. Alternatively, if he sues only on his own be-
half, the stare decisis effect of a decision upholding the quota will
likely chill repeated litigation by other applicants. The risk of re-
peated litigation is very slight.
2. Representation at the Answer and Beyond.
a. Where Someone Answers on Behalf of the Class. Nine
hundred employees receiving a summons are not going to hire 900
I9 339 U.S. at 310, 317-18.
,97 Other examples include In re Century Brass Products, Inc., 795 F.2d 265, 275 (2d
Cir. 1986) (court appointed representative of retired employees of bankrupt employer); In re
Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1043 (3d Cir. 1985) (guardian ad litem for unknown future
asbestos victims).
"' See A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 5-22, 5-23; A.B.A. Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7 comment 9, and Rule 1.8(f).
"' Compare Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction,
1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241, 287-88. Professor Hazard suggests that unidentifiable claimants are
properly barred not by ineffectual publication notice, but by statutes of limitations. With
respect to future applicants, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until their
application is rejected.
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separate lawyers and file 900 separate answers."' Left to their own
devices, some may answer and many may default. If all goes well,
they may pool their resources, hire one lawyer, and organize them-
selves into one or more natural classes with emergent leaders as
class representatives. A court interested in manageable litigation
and a just resolution on the merits would encourage and facilitate
that process.
Events will often not proceed so well. But groups of employees
have organized themselves in just this way in some of the reported
cases. 01 Creditors' committees organize themselves in this way in
bankruptcy cases.20 2 Creditors' committees may find it easier to or-
ganize, because the court can authorize payment of attorneys' fees
from the bankrupt estate,0 3 and the average creditor is probably
more legally sophisticated than the average blue collar worker. But
workers have a different advantage; they are a social group in daily
contact. A union that is unable to represent both sides in such a
dispute may well be able to help both sides find representation.
In the likely event that some bewildered workers show up on
answer day without counsel or any notion of how to proceed, the
court can help them get their day in court without abandoning its
neutral role. The court can explain the need for a lawyer and the
advantages of having a single lawyer represent all similarly situ-
ated workers. It can explain that they are more likely to get ade-
quate and affordable representation if they answer as class repre-
sentatives and share the cost, and that a lawyer may be able to
help organize the class.
When a client asks a lawyer to represent him, and when the
200 See Charles Dickens, Bleak House 22 (Signet ed. 1964) ("Eighteen of Mr. Tangle's
learned friends, each armed with a little summary of eighteen hundred sheets, bob up like
eighteen hammers in a pianoforte, make eighteen bows, and drop into their eighteen places
of obscurity.").
2" See Corley v. Jackson Police Dept., 755 F.2d 1207, 1208-09 (5th Cir. 1985) (describ-
ing collateral suits and motions to intervene by white police officers); Williams v. City of
New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1556 (5th Cir. 1984) (intervention by classes of Anglo, His-
panic, and female police officers); Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1982)
(motion to intervene by eleven white firefighters on behalf of all others); Culbreath v.
Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1980) (motion to intervene by professional organization
formed during pendency of case); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289, 294
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (intervention by eighteen cannery workers on behalf of class); Deveraux v.
Geary, 765 F.2d 268, 270 (1st Cir. 1985) (independent law suit by five white police officers,
not on behalf of class).
202 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1982). The court takes the initiative in appointing the first
creditors' committee, id. at § 1102(a)(1), but the parties take the initiative in creating addi-
tional committees for separate classes of creditors and equity holders, id at § 1102(a)(2).
20I See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(3), 503(b)(4), 1103(a) (1982).
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client cannot be adequately represented unless the cost can be
shared with others similarly situated, organizing the class is part of
the representation of the original client. In such situations, restric-
tions on solicitation by lawyers should not preclude the lawyer
from recruiting additional class members to share the cost, or from
speaking at meetings of potential class members. °4
Defendants who initially default can be included in a subse-
quent class certification. The reasons are similar to the reasons a
Title VII plaintiff can represent class members who have not satis-
fied the procedural prerequisites to being a plaintiff." 5 If some C
files a timely answer, A and B know that there is opposition to
overriding C's rights, and that C's answer may be amended to al-
lege that C represents a class. That gives A and B adequate notice
and serves the purposes of the rule requiring an answer within
twenty days.0 6 Requiring all members of the class to answer
within twenty days, or requiring those who do answer to initially
and explicitly answer on behalf of all, would convert the twenty-
day limit for answer into an engine of destruction for the rights of
a large class of unsophisticated defendants. Indeed, if no C answers
within twenty days, but someone answers soon thereafter, and
before A and B have been prejudiced by the delay, there is power
to accept the answer and vacate any default judgment previously
entered.207 Courts should exercise that power for unsophisticated
defendants; a whole class should not be barred because a pro se
answer was filed on the twenty-third day.
Stringent enforcement of default rules could make the C class
worse off than if it had not been served. If these employees were
not served, a representative seeking to intervene on behalf of the
class should have far more than twenty days to do so. The purpose
of notice is to provide more adequate procedural protection; it
204 See A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility D.R. 2-104(A)(5) ("If success in as-
serting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in the nature of a class action is depen-
dent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but shall not seek, employment from
those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder."). See also In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978) (solicitation even of the first claimant is constitutionally protected where moti-
vated by desire of non-profit organization to advocate political beliefs through litigation on
behalf of appropriate clients).
205 Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771 (1976); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975).
206 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 12(a).
207 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 55(c) ("For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry
of default .... "); Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1983); Farnese v. Bagnasco,
687 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1982); Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1981); Keegel v. Key
West & Caribbean Trading Co., Inc., 627 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Charles Alan Wright,
Arthur R. Miller and Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2693 (1983).
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should not take away the second-best protection provided by the
possibility that a self-appointed leader will act to protect the class.
Certifying class representatives from among those who have
answered and taken an active role in the litigation is a much less
hazardous enterprise than certifying class representatives before
the initial notice. Courts have some experience with comparable
choices in litigation involving multiple potential representatives on
the plaintiffs' side.210 The process is often unprincipled, but it is
better than the alternative of wholly unmanageable litigation.
Once a defendant class is certified, the litigation can proceed
under Rule 23. The employer and the representatives of the two
classes (minority employees and other employees) may negotiate a
trilateral consent decree, or they may litigate the case. The consent
decree would be subject to a reasonableness hearing under Rule 23,
but absent class members adequately represented by the class rep-
resentative could not veto the settlement or insist on full litigation.
b. Where No One Answers for the Class. It may be that all
those who answer do so individually and have no interest in repre-
senting the class. If only a small number of affected employees an-
swer, and if the others are barred by their default, those who an-
swer may acquire power to extract excessive compensation or
protections for themselves. If 850 white employees are bound by
their default, it is easy to envision a settlement in which the fifty
who answered are exempted from operation of a quota, or in which
the fifty receive a cash payment to consent to the quota. It is one
thing to have the interests of all the white employees represented
in a dispute that directly affects them; it is less attractive to have a
few white employees extracting private benefits at the expense of
both the minority employees and the bulk of the white employees.
That result may be unattractive, but it follows from our gen-
eral practice with respect to default judgments. The court has only
limited powers to prevent it. Where there is a natural class and
where those who answer are natural candidates for the position of
class representative, the court can encourage them to act as class
representative, but it cannot force them to do so. The court can
point out that it may be in their interest to act as class representa-
tive: they greatly increase their chances of paying a lawyer to re-
208 See, for example, MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958); Howard v.
McLucas, 87 F.R.D. 704 (M.D. Ga. 1980); Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, 298 F.
Supp. 288 (E.D. La. 1969); Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1765
(cited in note 207); Richard L. Marcus & Edward F. Sherman, Complex Litigation 643-53
(1985).
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present them adequately. But if all those who answer do so indi-
vidually and refuse to represent the class, the absent class
members are barred by their own default. If no C answers, the en-
tire class is barred by default, and A and B can file their consent
decree.
These results are not attractive, but they are not peculiar to
trilateral litigation. Courts regularly enter default judgments
against unsophisticated litigants. We can probably do more than
we do to protect such defendants from their lack of sophistication,
but that is not the subject of this paper. Whatever protections our
system provides unsophisticated litigants generally should be avail-
able to an unsophisticated C. That he is C rather than B does not
entitle him to more.
CONCLUSION
For a party in our legal system to be bound by a judicial de-
cree without ever having a chance to be heard is obviously an
anomaly. Yet that will be the result as long as Local Number 93's
rule that C cannot prevent entry of a consent decree between A
and B coexists with the lower courts' rule that C cannot thereafter
attack the consent decree either in separate litigation or by inter-
vening in the original case.
The courts have stumbled into this anomaly because their at-
tention was focused elsewhere. Many factors have contributed to
this development: the policy that favors settlement; the sense that
A and B are entitled to make their own deal; the fear that C would
unduly complicate the negotiations; the desire to clear the docket;
and perhaps most of all, our commitment to economic justice for
the victims of racial discrimination. The combination of these fac-
tors has led to a series of decisions that make C go away. C is al-
ways raising his claims in the wrong place or at the wrong time or
in the wrong way. Collectively, these decisions have effectively
barred C altogether in the quota cases. In other kinds of trilateral
disputes, the record is mixed; courts have been more sensitive to
C's procedural rights when their judgment is not clouded by
race.
209
2019 See Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1986) (permitting independent suit chal-
lenging consent decree); Secretary of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 695-97 (7th Cir.
1986) (vacating consent decree on motion of intervenor); Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States
Dept. of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1984) (vacating consent decree on motion of
intervenor); Harrisburg Ch. of Am. Civ. Lib. v. Scanlon, 500 Pa. 549, 458 A.2d 1352 (1983)
(refusing to enter consent decree without participation of affected third party); County of
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The only reliable solution is that provided by the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court in Harrisburg ACLU: courts should not enter
consent decrees without the consent of all the foreseeable parties
whose arguable legal rights are directly affected. The second-best
solution is to vigorously and effectively abolish the rule prohibiting
independent litigation by C. If a nonconsenting C objects to a con-
sent decree, the parts of the decree that affect C should be vacated
and the case restored to the docket.
Orange v. Air California, 799 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986) (denying intervention but dictum that
third party was not bound by consent decree); National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 744
F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1984) (nonparty bound on peculiar facts, but dictum that nonparties
should usually not be bound). See also United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385
(1977) (member of plaintiff class can intervene after judgment when class representative
fails to appeal denial of class certification); Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100, 108-12
(1969) (nonparty not bound by litigated decree, even though affiliated with party);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940) (class member not bound by decree entered in
litigation by class representative with conflicting interests); Chase National Bank v. Nor-
walk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1933) (non party not bound by litigated decree, even if he could
have intervened); In re Century Brass Products, Inc., 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1986) (refusing
to treat union as representative of both active and retired employees). But see Wilder v.
Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1321-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (nonparty objecting to consent decree
limited to fairness hearing).
